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ABSTRACT 
The main thesis of this paper is that the Court of Appeal and the Employment Court have 
taken divergent approaches to employment law issues since the New Right revolution and 
the passing of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. The Employment Court is more likely 
to apply principles which recognise inequality in the employment relationship and promote 
worker protection, while in general the Court of Appeal has adopted a stricter approach 
based on the rules relating to commercial contracts and has acted as a restraining influence 
on the development of employment law principles. This paper argues that the divergent 
principles applied reflect different political approaches by the judges. 
Part I of this paper reviews the history and nature of the specialist employment law 
jurisdiction in New Zealand and the historical relationship between the specialist 
employment courts and the general courts. Part II describes three benchmarks against 
which the approaches of the Court of Appeal and Employment Court judges are assessed: 
Griffith's analysis of the politics of the judiciary; the extent to which judges resort to 
common law principles and methods of reasoning which historically have been hostile to 
workers; and the influence of the New Right revolution. 
In Part III of the paper three cases are analysed in the light of these benchmarks: 
Wellington Caretakers JUOW v G N Hale & Sons; NZ Post Primary Teachers' Assn v 
Attorney-General; and TNT Worldwide Express (NZ) Ltd v Cunningham. Part IV of the 
paper recognises some exceptions to the trends discussed earlier in the paper, notes the 
Employment Court's recent emphasis on the right of freedom of association in a bargaining 
context, and queries the likely approach of the Court of Appeal on this issue. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, notes and acknowledgements. footnotes, 
bibliography and appendix) comprises approximately 20,000 words. 
r w um~ARY 
VICTORIA Uii , -.P.StTY. OE YJ~LLll~I,;\ 0 ~ 
(iv) 
A Books, Articles and Reports 
Full references to material referred to in this research paper are contained in the Bibliography. 
The following abbreviations are used in the text : 
Davidson The Jud1ciaf} and EmplO) ment I..,m,, 
Deeks et al Labour and Employment RelaJions 
Geare Industrial Relations 
Griffith 
Hughes Labour Law 
James New Territory 
Kelsey Rolling Back the State 
Mancini 
Mazengarb 's Employment Law 
Mathieson Industrial Law 
Ryan and Walsh "Labour Law v Common Law" 
Wedderburn The Worker and the Law 
Wedderburn "Freedom of Association" 
Wedderburn et al Builaing on Kahn-Freund 
F Davidson The Judiciary and the Development of 
Employment Law (Gower Publishing Co, 
Hampshire , 1984) 
J Deeks, J Parker and R Ryan Labour and 
Employment RelaJions in New Zealand (2 ed, 
Longman Paul , Auck.land, 1994) 
A J Geare The System of Industrial Relations in New 
Zealand (2 ed, Butterworths , Wellington, 1994) 
J A G Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary ( 4 ed, 
Fontana Press , London, 1991) 
J Hughes Labour Law in New Zealand (The Law 
Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1989) 
C James New Territory. The Transformation of New 
Zealand 1984 - 1992 (Bridget Williams Books, 
Wellington, 1992) 
J Kelsey Rolling Back the State. Privatisation of 
Power in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Bridget Williams 
Books, Wellington, 1993) 
G F Mancini "Politics and the Judges - The 
European Perspective" (1980) 43 MLR 1 
R Mackay and R McArtney (eds) Mazengarb 's 
Employment Law (Vo! 1, Bunerworths, Wellington, 
1994) 
D L Mathieson Industrial Law in New Zealand 
(Sweet and Maxwell (NZ) Ltd, Wellington, 1970) 
R Ryan and P Walsh "Labour Law v Common Law: 
the New Zealand Debate" (1993) Aust J Lab L 230 
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton The Worker and the 
Law (3 ed, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1986) 
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton "Freedom of 
Association and Philosophies of Labour Law" (1989) 
15 ILJ 1 
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, R Lewis and J Clark 
Labour Law and Industrial RelaJions: Builaing on 
Kahn-Freund (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983) 
(v) 
B Cases 
Names of cases may be abbreviated in the text and in footnotes eg Wellington etc Caretakers 
etc JUOW v G N Hale & Sons Ltd becomes Hale. 
C Judicial Bodies and Organisations 
The following abbreviations are used for courts, tribunals and organisations in footnotes but 
not in the text: 
CA 
EC 
ET 
HC 
SC 
LC 
BRT 
NZLS 
NZIIRR 
NZCTU 
NZEF 
Court of Appeal 
Employment Court 
Employment Tribunal 
High Court 
Supreme Court 
Labour Court 
Business Roundtable 
New Zealand Law Society 
New Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Research 
New Zealand Council of Trade Unions 
New Zealand Employers' Federation 
D Legislation 
The following abbreviations are used in both the text and in footnotes: 
IRA Industrial Relations Act 1973 
LRA Labour Relations Act 1987 
ECA Employment Contracts Act 1991 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Thanks to Chris Finlayson for his helpful advice. Thanks also to Graeme Buchanan, 
Owen Eastwood, Virginia Hardy, Caroline Holden, Rose Ryan and Richard Whatman 
for their comments. Thanks to the staff of the Employment Court Library and the 
Department of Labour Information Centre, especially John Leggott. Most of all thanks 
to Sham and Stephen for their support over the last three years . 
I THE JURISDICTION AND APPROACH OF THE SPECIALIST AND 
GENERAL COURTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 
A Introduction 
Industrial relations and employment law are highly political matters and the specialist 
employment institutions are more vulnerable to political pressure than the general courts. 
Sir Owen Woodhouse recognised this in 1983 when he commented on the need to "guard 
against undue and even harmful pressure that could arise in some future economic or 
political climate" by protecting the work of the specialist institutions. 1 In 1992 and 1993 
the Employment Court established under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) was 
subjected to a sustained ideological and political attack.2 In July 1992 for example Mr A 
Jones, Industrial Relations Manager for Fletcher Challenge,3 called for the abolition of the 
court. He said that it was "in danger of abandoning longstanding legal principles for 'social 
policies' that are idealistic, theoretical, untested and impractical. "4 He said that the court's 
decisions showed a bias against employers and that its "long and complex" judgments 
would enable the court to obscure its real intention of giving itself "a licence towards 
judicial activism." 5 Jones also referred to the allegedly high rate at which the Court of 
Appeal was overturning Employment Court decisions.6 The attacks echoed earlier 
criticism of the Labour Court7 and were part of a campaign for the abolition of a 
specialised employment law jurisdiction. 8 
1 Sir Owen Woodhouse "The Judge in Today's Society" (Auckland Law School Centenary Lectures, Legal 
Research Foundation Inc, Law School, University of Auckland, Auckland, I 983) 87, 95. He considered that 
this may be better done "under the constitutional umbrella of the judicial branch rather than left so closely 
associated with and influenced by the executive government." 
2 This attack is documented by R Ryan & P Walsh "Common Law versus Labour Law: The Debate over 
the Future of the Specialist Institutions" (Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, 
Working Paper 2/93, 1993) 13 - 15. In particular see New Zealand Business Roundtable/New Zealand 
Employers' Federation A Study of the Labour/Employment Court (NZBRT/NZEF, December 1992). 
3 Also a board member of the NZ Employers' Federation (Inc) and of the Business Roundtable . 
4 "Employer Wants Court Abolished" (The Dominion, 10 August, 1992). 
5 Above. 
6 "The Overturning o(Employment Court Decisions" (The Dominion, 12 August 1993). Mr Jones said that 
over half of 48 appeals from decisions of the LC and EC to the CA had been upheld, and that decisions of 
the Chief Judge were particularly susceptible to overturning by the CA. Further analysis indicated that these 
figures were incorrect: R Ryan and P Walsh "Common Law v Labour Law: the New Zealand Debate" 
(1993) Aust J Lab L 230,253 (hereafter Ryan and Walsh "Common Law v Labour Law"). In October 1993 
the Minister of Employment, Hon W F Birch, said that the number of appeals from decisions of the EC was 
much smaller and that, given the dramatic nature of the changes brought about by the ECA, "one might have 
expected a much higher level of appeals": "Birch Defends Role of Labour Court" (Evening Post, 11 October 
1993). 
7 In 1989 Hon W F Birch MP said that "[t]he Labour Court has not really discharged its responsibilities 
properly": (New Zealand Herald, 27 April 1989). 
8 Ryan and Walsh "Common Law v Labour Law" 248 - 250. 
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No other court in New Zealand's history has been subjected to such a direct and sustained 
ideologically-based attack nor received such little political support.9 The attacks have 
subsided since the 1993 General Election, but they raised important questions of 
constitutional 10 and employment law which have not yet been fully explored. This paper 
looks at one of those questions: the nature and extent of divergence in the principles of 
employment law currently applied by the Employment Court and the Court of Appeal. 
Business Roundtable criticisms which implied 11 that the Court of Appeal was almost 
automatically overturning appeals from Employment Court decisions were exaggerated. 12 
Nevertheless it remains true that the rate of successful appeals has increased 13 and that the 
Court of Appeal's traditional hands-off approach to employment law questions and 
deference to the specialist knowledge of the Employment Court's predecessors have all but 
disappeared. 
Part I of this paper summarises the development of the jurisdiction of the specialist 
employment institutions and discusses their relationship with the general courts. Part II 
discusses the politics of, and judicial attitudes to, employment law and sets out the points 
of reference from which the different approaches of the Employment Court and Court of 
Appeal are later analysed. Part III analyses the judicial politics in three employment law 
cases in which the two courts reached different results by applying different legal 
principles. Part IV discusses the likely approach of both courts to employment law issues 
in the future . 
B The Development of the Specialist Employment Law Jurisdiction 
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 was intended to prevent strikes and 
lockouts by fostering the development of unions and setting up a system for resolving 
disputes through a specialist Court of Arbitration and wage-fixing conciliation councils, 
both with tripartite representation: 14 
9 G Anderson "The Judiciary, the Court and Appeals" [1993] ELB 90. As late as September 1993 MP and 
Chair of the Labour Select Committee Mr M R Bradford criticised the court for being "rather cavalier about 
its judgments in relation to its responsibilities to the wider judicial system" and said that "[t]he jury is still 
out on the future of the Employment Court" : "Employment Court's Future 'Under Review' " (The Evening 
Post, 17 September 1993). 
IO Anderson, above, 90, argues that the attacks on the EC undermined the independence of the judiciary. 
11 Above, 90. 
12 Above n 2, 15. 
13 Department of Labour, Report to the Minister of Labour, 6 September 1993. 
14 J Deeks, J Parker and R Ryan Labour and Employment Relations in New Zealand(2 ed, Longman Paul, 
Auckland, 1994) 45 - 46 (hereafter Deeks et al, Labour and Employment Relations). 
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[It] was Reeves's solution to the central problems of how to encourage economic development while 
protecting the interests of weak groups of workers and minimising the possibility of social disruption 
through strike activity ... a system .. . designed to resolve industrial conflict without social disruption. 
The main function of the original Court of Arbitration was to make awards which fixed 
wages and working conditions for unionised workers. The court also had jurisdiction to 
interpret awards and industrial agreements and to award penalties for breaches of awards, 
but was "difficult to regard ... as a true court in the sense of a body primarily created to 
resolve justiciable disputes. Economic disputes or disputes of interest can not be resolved 
by the normal techniques of judicial reasoning and legal logic." 15 Initially Judges of the 
Court of Arbitration were judges of the Supreme Court: "it was customary to appoint the 
most junior puisnejudge to the Court of Arbitration." 16 This practice ceased in 1921 when 
Frazer J was appointed, although Supreme Court judges could still be appointed as 
temporary Court of Arbitration judges. 17 The Supreme Court (and later the High Court) 
have never been superior to the specialist courts in the judicial hierarchy, and neither court 
is bound by the decisions of the other. 18 
The Court of Arbitration became ineffective in the 1960s and early 1970s when direct 
bargaining outside the system grew and it gradually lost its status as an arbitral body on 
wages and conditions.19 The Industrial Relations Act 1973 (IRA) created new institutions: 
an Industrial Commission, to deal with wage fixing matters ("disputes of interest") and an 
Industrial Court, to deal with "disputes of rights" including the interpretation and 
enforcement of awards and the new personal grievance action.20 
15 G Anderson "Specialist Employment Law and Specialist Institutions" (Paper presented to the NZ Institute 
of Industrial Relations Research Seminar on a Specialist Employment Law Jurisdiction: the Future of the 
Employment Court and the Employment Tribunal, Wellington, 23 April 1993) (hereafter NZIIRR Seminar) 
2. 
16 D L Mathieson Industrial Law in New Zealand (Sweet and Maxwell (NZ) Ltd, Wellington, 1970) 291 
(hereafter Mathieson Industrial Law). 
17 Above. 
I8 See Mathieson Industrial Law 297 - 298 on precedent in the C of Arb. In/n re New Zealand Harbour 
Boards' Employees' Award [1944) NZLR 258 (C of Arb) Tyndall J refused to follow a decision of Myers CJ 
in NZ Harbour Boards '. IVOE v Tyndall [ 1944] NZLR 43 (SC). Tyndall J's approach was essentially upheld 
by the CA in NZ Harbour Boards' JVOE v Tyndall [1944) NZLR 584. In Wellington etc Clerical Workers 
/VOW v Greenwich [1983) ACJ 965 , Williamson J said (979) that "we were somewhat surprised to read 
what are possibly obiter dicta of the Court of Appeal in Quality Pizzas Ltd v Canterbury Hotel Employees 
/VOW [Unreported, 26 October 1983, CA 17/83) stating that the Arbitration Court is an inferior court of 
justice. We have hitherto regarded it as a superior Court of Industrial Relations exercising jurisdictions not 
possessed by the High Court, and not appealable on merit to any other Court, and consisting in part of the 
highest form of jurisdiction; namely legislative. The fact that no other Court has authority to exercise those 
jurisdictions would seem to make the Arbitration Court the superior court in respect of those jurisdictions." 
19 Ryan and Walsh "Common Law v Labour Law" 230 - 235 . 
20 A Mediation Service, the forerunner of the mediation jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal, was 
established in 1970: A J Geare The System of Industrial Relations in New Zealand (2 ed, Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1988) 62 - 63 (hereafter Geare Industrial Relations. 
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From 1894 jurisdiction over employment law matters was gradually concentrated in the 
specialist institutions.21 The IRA continued this trend by removing the Court of Appeal's 
jurisdiction to hear appeals on questions relating to the construction of awards and 
agreements22 and by giving the Industrial Court exclusive jurisdiction to deal with actions 
to recover statutory penalties.23 Previously Magistrate's Courts had also had independent 
jurisdiction to deal with penalty actions and actions for breach of award, and thus had a 
role in interpreting awards and agreements.24 Apart from a brief period from 1981 to 1987 
when the District Court had power to award penalties in relation to certain strike activity,25 
complete jurisdiction over the making, interpretation, and enforcement of awards was 
given to the specialist institutions in 1973. The common law had very limited application 
in the conciliation and arbitration system. Lawyers were generally excluded from 
arbitration proceedings and conciliation councils where common law principles had little 
relevance.26 
In 1977 a new Arbitration Court was established with "legal" and wage fixing roles once 
more combined in a single institution.27 The Court had a "generally high degree of 
acceptance",28 but the Labour Government's review of industrial relations in 1985 - 198629 
resulted in further change. The Labour Relations Act 1987 (LRA) established a Labour 
Court which differed from its predecessors in that it was a court of record, not a court of 
conciliation and arbitration.30 Tripartite representation was retained only for personal 
grievance, demarcation, and parental leave hearings. 31 The Labour Court was also given 
2 1 Mathieson Industrial Law 333 . The civil courts lost their exclusive jurisdiction over claims for arrears of 
wages in 1943 : see NZ Harbour Boards ' IUOE v Tyndall, above n 18, 592 - 593 . 
22 D L Mathieson Industrial Law in New Zealand. Supplement to Volume 1 (Sweet and Maxwell (NZ) Ltd, 
Wellington, 1975)91. 
23 Although the power to delegate functions to the Magistrate's Court was retained: IRA s 49. The power to 
delegate was finally removed by the LRA 1987 . 
24 Mathieson Industrial Law 250. 
25 See A Szakats (ed) Mazengarb's Industrial Relations and Industrial Law(4 ed, Butterworths) s 147 
commentary. 
26 IRA s 54(4) provided that no barrister or solicitor with a current practising certificate could appear or be 
heard before the Industrial Court in arbitration proceedings except by consent. McCarthy J inNZ Printing 
etc IUOW v McKenzie & Willis [1982] ACJ 653 (CA) noted (656) that "there has been a fairly consistent 
tendency to exclude barristers and solicitors in the absence of consent, from the disposal of substantive issues 
involved in industrial disputes .... " 
27 Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1977. 
28 Ryan and Walsh "Common Law v Labour Law" 232. 
29 Minister of Labour Industrial Relations: a Framework for Review Vo! 1 and Vo! 2 (New Zealand 
Government, Wellington, 1985) (the "Green Paper"); Industrial Relations: A Framework for Review -
Summary of Submissions (Wellington, 1986); Government Policy Statement on Industrial Relations 
(Wellington, 1986). 
30 LRA 1987 s 278. See J Hughes Labour Law in New Zealand(The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1990) 
Yo! I para 9.30 pp 5276 - 5277. 
31 An Arbitration Commission with jurisdiction over disputes of interest was also established under the 
LRA: seess 147-151 and259-277 . 
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exclusive jurisdiction over a wider range of employment law matters,32 including judicial 
review proceedings against statutory officers with industrial relations functions, 
proceedings founded on the industrial torts33 and proceedings for the grant of injunctions 
against strikes or lockouts.34 These matters had previously been subject to the jurisdiction 
of the High Court. Ryan and Walsh conclude:35 
In summary then, the historical development of the specialist jurisdiction in New Zealand has 
involved the gradual change from a tripartite structure dealing largely with wage-fixing matters to a 
system in which a number of issues involved in the employment relationship have come under the 
jurisdiction of an increasingly legally based Court. 
In 1991 this trend culminated in the establishment of a specialist and mainly appellate 
Employment Court and a "low level, informal" Employment Tribunal "to provide speedy, 
fair and just resolution of differences between parties to employment contracts. "36 Both 
Court and Tribunal have "exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any proceedings 
founded on an employment contract. "37 The residual power of the general courts to deal 
with contracts of employment outside the system of awards and agreements disappeared 
almost entirely in 1991, 38 with jurisdiction over not only the industrial torts but also cases 
involving restraint of trade, the duties of confidentiality and fidelity, and wrongful 
dismissal being conferred exclusively on the Employment Court.39 There is a right of 
appeal to the Court of Appeal on questions of law and from Employment Court decisions 
involving the industrial torts, contempt of court and applications for review.40 However, 
there is no appeal to the Court of Appeal from Employment Court decisions on the 
construction of employment contracts.41 
Despite the Court's "equity and good conscience" jurisdiction,42 its discretion to admit 
evidence other than "strictly legal" evidence,43 and its power to make its own rules 
32 LRA s 279(4). Previously these had been subject to the jurisdiction of the HC (see Part I Cl below). 
33 The industrial (or "economic") torts are discussed in R Mackay and R McArtney (eds)Mazengarb 's 
Employment Law Val I (Butterworths, Wellington, 1994) paras 1400 - 1447 pp B/40 I - B/472 (hereafter 
Mazengarb's Employment Law). 
34 ECA ss 280(1), 242(1) and 243(1) respectively. 
35 R Ryan and P Walsh "Common Law versus Labour Law: the Debate over the Future of the Specialist 
Institutions" (Working Paper 2/93 , Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University, Wellington, 1993) 3. 
36 ECA s 76(c). 
37 ECAs3(1). 
38 The HC's residual jurisdiction in respect of certain tortious action is discussed in Mazengarb's 
Employment Law para V27 p A/822 . 
39 ECA s 4(1 ). 
40 ECA ss 132 - 135. 
4 1 ECA s 135( I). EC judges are appointed by the Governor-General and must be barristers and solicitors of 
not Jess than 7 years' standing of the High Court. They hold office during good behaviour, may be removed 
by the Governor General upon the address of the House of Representatives, and must retire at the age of 68 : 
ECA s 113. 
42 ECA s 194. 
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regarding practice and procedure,44 an increasingly legalistic approach is taken by the 
employment institutions in employment disputes, and all trace of tripartite representation, 
even in personal grievances, has disappeared. Lawyers now appear (wigged and gowned) 
in most Employment Court proceedings and frequently appear before the Tribunal in both 
its adjudication and mediation jurisdictions. 
C The Approach of the General Courts to Employment Law 
1 The Supreme Court and High Court 
Historically the Supreme Court and High Court had a limited influence on employment law 
except in cases involving non-unionised employees whose employment relationships 
continued to be regulated by the common law. This changed in the early 1970s with the 
rise of industrial militancy including strike action.45 Until the LRA introduced a legal right 
to strike in 1987, "all strikes and lockouts were tortious acts or breaches of contract or 
both, although some were more unlawful than others. "46 Despite this, civil proceedings in 
respect of industrial action were rare until 1970.47 Greenslade refers to "a long period 
starting with World War II and the subsequent 'full employment' when it was generally 
viewed as unacceptable for patriotic, humanist, socially sensitive, or simply "political", 
reasons to seek legal compensation for economic damage suffered in industrial disputes. "48 
Writing in 1981 , Reid said:49 
Very few strikes in New Zealand are legal, though most in the UK would fall within that "golden 
formula" which gives them legitimacy if they are called "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade 
dispute". The strike figures for the two countries are nevertheless comparable. Statutory control 
may have made unions weaker on the job in this country, but it has not stopped them from using 
those tactics which produce results . Thus those unions which have the ability to "go back to their 
members" will do so whether the rules of the game permit it or not, rather than ask the Arbitration 
Court to arrive at a settlement. 
When employers began to challenge strikes through actions founded on the industrial torts, 
they got a sympathetic response from the Supreme Court, which retained jurisdiction over 
such actions. The court had no difficulty in applying in a New Zealand context the 
43 ECA s 126(1). 
44 ECA s 130(1). 
45 Mazengarb 's Employment Law para V8 p A/808 ; Deeks et al Labour and Employment Relations 55 - 56. 
46 Chief Judge T G Goddard "Strikes, Lockouts, Pickets and the Remedies: New Directions Under the 
Labour Relations Act 1987 and the Common Law" [ 1990] ILB 41 , 43 (Part I of a paper delivered to the 
Commonwealth Law Conference, Auckland, 1990). 
47 Mazengarb's Employ ment Law para Vl4 p A/812 . 
48 B Greenslade "Strikes, Injunctions and Compliance Orders: the Labour Relations Act I 987 (1988) 13 
NZJIR 69 n26. 
49 [1981] NZLJ 457, 459. Reid, a lawyer, was at that time Secretary of the Auckland Shop Employees' 
Union. 
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principles developed by the English courts to the industrial torts and labour injunctions. 50 
Little or no consideration was given to whether New Zealand's statutory system could 
"readily receive a transplant of common law rules that have been developed essentially in 
the context of the British industrial relations system and in a foreign political and legal 
environment." 51 Nor, despite the absence of statutory immunities for New Zealand 
unions, 52 did the general courts consider whether an expansion of the defences available to 
unions in industrial tort cases was justified. 
In 1987 Sir Ivor Richardson commented that "any intrusion by the High Court into 
industrial relations, even if there is jurisdiction, must undermine to some extent the 
legislative policies underlying the Industrial Relations Act 1973. "53 The High Court's 
decisions resulted occasionally in industrial relations disasters such as the gaoling of 
Drivers' Union Secretary Bill Andersen in 1974. He was subsequently released "to head a 
triumphal march down the centre of Auckland." 54 One commentator "doubt[ed] that the 
troubles at Marsden Point, Mangere Bridge or the BNZ could happen under the Labour 
Relations Act. They would all have been handled very differently and I venture to suggest 
that both employers and unions would have had full confidence in the Labour Court's 
ability to deal with those cases."55 Hughes says:56 
[A]t common law, the practice adopted on applications for injunctions has heavily favoured strike 
bound employers. Recognition of these factors contributed to the widely held view in trade union 
circles that the common law courts have little understanding of, and little sympathy for, trade union 
objectives and was a central consideration in the transfer of jurisdiction to the Labour Court. 
2 The Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal has taken a "cautious approach" 57 to labour legislation. It has tended 
to endorse the principles developed and refined by the specialist courts, particularly in the 
50 G Anderson "The Reception of the Economic Torts into New Zealand Labour Law: A Preliminary 
Discussion" (1987) 12 NZJIR 89, 95 - 96. 
51 Above, 90. · 
52 Above, 97 . 
53 "The Role of the Courts in Industrial Relations" (1987) 12 NZnR 113, 114 - 115 . See also G Anderson 
"Strikes and the Law: The Problems of Legal Intervention in Labour Disputes" (1988) 13 NZJIR 21 . 
54 Geare Industrial Relations 282. 
55 D Clark "Do We Need a Labour Court?" (NZ Business, May 1990) 50 (the author was a tutor in Labour 
Relations and Human Resource Management at Auckland Technical Institute). The respective jurisdictions 
of the HC and LC where strikes or lockouts occurred is discussed by J HughesLabour Law in New Zealand 
(The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1989) para 11.485 p 7206 - 7207 (hereafter Hughes Labour Law). 
56 Hughes Labour Law para 11 .895 p 7654. 
57 Above n 53, 117. Compare Collins view that the English judiciary tried to subvert protectionist labour 
legislation (below n 150). 
8 
area of personal grievances,58 and in some cases has extended principles of statutory 
employment law to the common law of employment. 59 Court of Appeal judges often 
deferred in courteous terms to the specialist knowledge and jurisdiction of the Arbitration 
Court:60 
It is not to be assumed that propositions of law, however prestigious and well established in the High 
Court or the Court of Appeal, will apply with the same clear force in the Arbitration Court. That is a 
specialist Court, designed for a specific field . In the matters directed by the statute to come before it, 
it has exclusive jurisdiction, and, when exercising it, it must take into account other considerations 
besides legal issues. It is concerned primarily with fairness. Thus it has been more than once said in 
this Court that legal technicalities or analogy of rules will not always be helpful in achieving the 
objects of a Court which has been given what Cooke J characterised as "unusual powers." 
In 1987 Sir Ivor Richardson concluded:61 
All in all , my impression is that the Court of Appeal has had a distinctly limited influence on the 
interpretation and application of industrial relations legislation. That may reflect a particularly 
cautious approach on the part of the Court or, as some might say, unwillingness to respond to social 
change in this area. It may suggest that the specialist court arrangements are working particularly 
well. In any event it seems consonant with the scheme and policy of the legislation that a court 
functioning as an appellate and review body on matters of law only should have a low, non-activist 
profile. 
However Court of Appeal judges seldom if ever developed rules which went beyond those 
already defined by the specialist courts62 and when common law causes of action were 
considered, the Court of Appeal did not modify the anti-worker bias of the common law. 
In particular no judicially sanctioned right to strike or picket at common law was ever 
recognised. In NZ Baking Trades JUW v General Foods Corp (NZ) Ltd Richardson J 
recognised that "the grant of an interim injunction in industrial matters necessarily shifts 
the balance of advantage without resolving the underlying issues1163 and said that in 
granting an interim injunction against a strike "the High Court concentrated on the 
contractual and property rights of the employer and the obligations of the workers and the 
58 See eg Hennessey v Auckland City Council [1981] ACJ 213 (AC); [1982] ACJ 699 (CA) and 
Mazengarb's Employment Law para Ill.29 p A/246 with respect to procedural fairness; Wellington etc 
Clerical Workers IUW v Greenwich [ I 993] ACJ 965 (AC) and Auckland Shop Employees Union v 
Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372 with respect to constructive dismissal; and Wellington Road 
Transport JUW v Fletcher Construction -Ltd [1983] ACJ 653 , 657 - 660 regarding burden of proof in 
personal grievance cases. 
59 For example Marlborough Harbour Boardv Goulden [1985] 2 NZLR 378. See also New Zealand Law 
Commission Aspects of Damages: Employment Contracts and the Rule inAddis v Gramophone Co - Report 
No 18 (Wellington, 1991) 16 - 18 and the comments (47) thatGou/den "may be explained more narrowly in 
terms of administrative law rules relating to the observance of natural justice by public agencies", while the 
Shop Employees case "may be explained in the statutory context of 'unjustifiable' dismissal." 
60 Winstone Clay Products Limitedv Cartledge (Inspector of Awards) [1984] ACJ 1035, 1038 (CA, per 
McCarthy J). 
61 Above n 53 , 117. 
62 See above n 59. 
63 [1985] 2 NZLR 110, 122. 
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union and emphasised the financial losses accruing from the strike to the employer and the 
workers without giving any obvious weight to the fact that Parliament has established a 
system of law designed to settle industrial disputes outside the ordinary courts. "64 The 
other members of the Court of Appeal recognised the desirability of the High Court 
refusing to handle employment law matters where the Arbitration Court had jurisdiction 
over the substance of a dispute, but nevertheless refused to rule accordingly:65 
There is some attraction in the approach that ... even though a tort action has been brought properly 
before it, the High Court should wash its hands of all responsibility for the time being and withhold 
any remedy until any case which happens to be pending in the Arbitration Court and has some link 
with the subject-matter of the High Court action has been disposed of. But that would be a radical 
change, having the effect of altering existing rights quite radically. 
A greater readiness to protect the rights of individuals acting alone rather than collectively 
is also discernible in judicial rulings. 66 The courts would not grant specific performance of 
an individual contract of employment to force an individual worker to work for a particular 
employer,67 but would grant injunctions which had the effect of forcing striking workers 
back to work. 68 Even strike action, by its very nature a collective action, was 
individualised:69 
If acting within the scope of authority from the workers, [the union] may present argument on their 
behalf that they have the right to strike. But iJ should not be overlooked that, if there is a right to 
strike, it belongs to the workers, not the union . 
... [W]hat the union cannot do, as the law stands, is to instigate the workers to strike in disregard of 
their individual lawful responsibilities to their employer. 
The general courts instinctively gave common law principles imported from England 
greater weight than New Zealand's indigenous industrial relations system which was, by 
the time of the first tort cases, over 70 years old. They failed to take the opportunity of 
developing an indigenous jurisprudence in this area, particularly given the complexity and 
inconsistency in the law relating to the economic torts . After the transfer of jurisdiction 
over the economic torts to the Labour Court, Goddard CJ signalled that the court may well 
develop an indigenous jurisprudence in this area, referring to "the still developing state of 
the law of tortious liability: 70 
64 Above. 
65 Above, per Cooke J, 118: "In a controversial field where traditionally the legislature has been active, I 
think that major change is best left to the legislature." See Sir Ivor Richardson's comments on this case, 
above n 53. 
66 Wedderburn The Worker-and the Law 142. 
67 A Sz.akats Law of Employment (3 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1988) para 29.5 p 292. 
68 Hughes Labour Law para 11.895 p 7654. 
69 NZ Baking Trades Union v General Foods Corporation (NZ) Ltd [ 1985] 2 NZLR I I 0, 118 (per Cooke J). 
7° Chief Judge T G Goddard "Strikes, Lockouts, Pickets and the Remedies: New Directions Under the 
Labour Relations Act 1987 and the Common Law (Part 3)" [1990) ILB 72. 
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The industrial scene is particularly apt for the assimilation of common law with common sense and, 
hopefully, some of the unanswered questions can be resolved. Does a defence of justification exist to 
all of the four torts and, if it does, what are its ingredients and its limitations in each case? ls proof 
required of an intention to injure the plaintiff, or is it sufficient that there is an intention to injure 
someone? Should the use of unlawful means make any difference? 
Unfortunately by the time the specialist courts were m a position to address these 
questions, the New Right revolution71 had reached the labour market. The subsequent 
decrease in the number of strikes72 has largely removed the issue from judicial scrutiny 
since 1991. 73 
D The Context of Change: Reform of the La.bour Market and the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 
1 The creation of a jurisprudential gap 
A comparison of the treatment of employment relationships by the judges of the Court of 
Appeal and the specialist employment courts before 1990 does not reveal significant 
differences in approach.74 Beginning with the Hale75 decisions, however, a divergence 
became apparent in the rules and methods of reasoning applied by the two courts in some 
cases. With some exceptions76 the Employment Court continued its traditional approach 
of applying legal principles which recognised the social and economic reality of the 
employment relationship and the need for worker protection against the operation of the 
71 The nature of the New Right revolution is discussed in Part I D 1. For a definition of "New Right" see J 
Kelsey Rolling Back the State. Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa/New Zealand(Bridget Williams Books, 
Wellington 1993) Chapter 22, 295 - 303 (hereafter Kelsey Rolling Back the State). For a definition of 
"revolution" see C James New Territory. The Transformation of New Zealand 1984 - 1992 (Bridget 
Williams Books, Wellington, 1992) Appendix 4 340 - 343 (hereafter James New Territory). 
72 Deeks et al Labour and Employment Relations 376. 
73 In noting that the general courts readily adopted common law principles in employment law cases, the 
writer does not suggest that the specialist courts applied "pro union" or "worker protection" principles 
without exception. For example the matters unions could legitimately pursue and bargain over were 
narrowly prescribed by the C of Arb in Ohinemuri Mines and Batteries Employees' JUW v Registrar of 
Industrial Unions [ 1917) NZLR 829: "Wages, conditions and hours really embrace the whole objects of the 
existence of industrial unions" (per Chapman J, 836). This narrow view was endorsed 60 years later by the 
Industrial Court in NZ Bank Officers JUW v ANZ Banking Group Ltd[1979] ICJ 379, 384, when Jamieson J 
said that staff loans were not industrial matters, and consequently could not be the subject of the dispute of 
rights. On this point see Geare Industrial Relations paras 704 - 712 pp 189 - 195 and P A Joseph "The 
Judicial Perspective of Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in New Zealand" (Legal Research Foundation, 
Publication No 17, I 979). 
74 R Ryan reported in "The Overturning of Employment Court Decisions" (The Dominion, 12 August I 993). 75 See Part IIIB. 
76 These are discussed in Part IV. 
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market. 77 The Court of Appeal began to adopt a stricter contract law approach which 
paid little heed to market place inequality. 78 
Any political and ideological differences between judges which may have existed before 
1990 had minimal effect on employment law because the comprehensive statutory 
regulation of industrial relations left little room for such differences to influence the 
outcome of cases. The removal of comprehensive statutory regulation left a 
jurisprudential gap which allowed the politics of the judiciary to have a discernible effect 
on the outcome of cases . By 1991 nee-classical or libertarian economic and social 
theories and ideologies had permeated intellectual thought, including, it is suggested, 
judicial thought, to an extent which was "unmistakable and deep. "79 It was not 
surprising, then, that the jurisprudential gap was filled to some extent by principles 
which reflected these theories and ideologies. 
The political, social and economic context within which these changes took place is 
described below. 
2 The Introduction of the ECA 
Between 1984 and 1993 an economic and social revolution occurred in New Zealand. In 
the name of freedom and economic efficiency the interventionist welfare state which 
New Zealanders had lived in for the greater part of the century was dismantled. State 
support for health, education and welfare services was severely cut back. 80 Regulatory 
reforms included:81 
[T]he virtual elimination of government support for the agricultural sector, the removal of 
exchange controls, the floating of the dollar, substantial deregulation of capital markets, the 
conversion of import quotas to tariffs and tariff reduction, reform of state sector businesses to 
promote commercial performance and competition (and ultimately some privatization of these 
businesses), and reforms to the "core" state sector to enhance managerial performance and 
accountability. 
77 This approach is, ·it is submitted, similar to that adopted by J Deeks et al Labour and Employment 
Relations (29 - 31) and set out in the Appendix to this paper. 
78 The same divergence in approach is apparent between the English Employment Appeal Tribunal and 
Court of Appeal : see N Fagan Contracts of Employment (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1990) 52; F 
Davidson The Judiciary and the Development of Employment Law(Gower Publishing Co, Hampshire, 1984) 
204 (hereafter Davidson The Judiciary and Employment Law). 
79 James New Territory 92. · 
80 Analyses of the revolution are contained in Kelsey Rolling Back the State. and James New Territory. See 
also M Taggart "Corporatisation, Privatisation and Public Law" ( 1991) 2 PLR 77 and "The Legacy of 
Rogemomics" (Dominion, 14 July I 994, Wellington, New Zealand) 9. 
8 I P Brook Cowen "Labor Relations Reform in New Zealand: The Employment Contracts Act and 
Contractual Freedom" (1993) 14 Journal of Labor Research 69, 77 - 78. 
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Until 1991 the labour market remained relatively unaffected by the free market 
revolution, largely because the Labour Party's political alliance with the trade union 
movement made radical reform of labour law electorally unpalatable. 82 The LRA, while 
encouraging site-based bargaining, did not remove the main protectionist elements of the 
old system: compulsory unionism and blanket (or industry) award coverage. The 
election of a National Government in 1990 enabled the revolution to be completed by 
deregulation of the labour market through repeal of the LRA and its replacement by the 
ECA. 
The principles of freedom of contract incorporated in the ECA were not new, but 
brought about a partial return to the principles of employment law which had existed 
before 1894. 83 The Act's bargaining provisions reflected a nee-classical economic 
approach, in particular the theories of Hayek84 that the market, private property and 
individualism are the natural social order and that any attempt to achieve social justice or 
to balance the interests of different groups in society by the state is an error. According 
to Hayek individual contracts of employment have no special character and should be 
governed by the principles of freedom of contract and the common law. The employee's 
freedom depends on choice between a great number and variety of employers, provided 
by a competitive market. Organised groups like trade unions create distortions in the 
market and should have no special legal status: 85 
[The] real exploiters in our present society are not egotistic capitalists or entrepreneurs, and in fact 
not separate individuals, but organisations which derive their power from the moral support of 
collective action and the feeling of group loyalty. 
Professor Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago developed these views into a 
legal philosophy in which there is no place for a specialist body of labour law or 
specialist institutions to apply that law. 86 In Epstein's theory of self-interest the best 
82 Above, 73 . 
83 See generally Mazengarb's Employment Law para pp A/1 - A/ 12. 
84 The influence on employment law of Professor Friedrich Hayek, the leading exponent of the Austrian 
school of economics, is discussed by Lord· Wedderburn "Freedom of Association and Philosophies of Labour 
Law" (1989) 15 ILJ I (hereafter Wedderburn "Freedom of Association"). For a brief summary see James 
New Territory. Appendix 3 (The Intellectual Challenge to the Welfare State) 334 - 339. See also Deeks et al 
Labour and Employment Relations 82 - 84. 
85 FA Hayek Law Legislation and Liberty ( 1979) 89 - 90 cited in Wedderburn "Freedom of Association" 9 
n28. As Wedderburn notes (12) this picture "may look rather antique in today's world of pyramid corporate 
groups, oligopoly and transnational capital." 
86 See eg R A Epstein "A Common Law for Labour Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor 
Legislation" (1983) 92 Yale LJ 1357; "A Common Law for Labor Relations and Reality: A Rejoinder to 
Professors Getman and Kohler" (1983) 92 Yale LJ 1435; "In Defence of the Contract at Will" (1984) 51 U 
Chi LR 947. Epstein's views are critiqued by N Wailes "The Case Against Specialist Jurisdiction for Labour 
Law: The Philosophical Assumptions of a Common Law for Labour Relations" (1994) 19 NZflR 1. See 
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system of labour relations is one where private property and personal liberty are 
maximised because in his or her own self-interest no employee would enter into an 
employment contract which was disadvantageous. The market will deliver appropriate 
levels of pay and conditions . According to Epstein the basic common law principles of 
property , contract and tort are the best legal foundation for employment contracts in a 
free market , and "the law should have no interest in or provision for fairness or equity in 
the content of contracts, provided there had been no misrepresentation, fraud or 
duress. "87 
The supremacy of the market and the common law and the need to abolish the specialist 
employment law jurisdiction were pushed relentlessly by the Business Roundtable from 
1986. 88 The LRA reforms did not conform sufficiently to the freedom of contract 
ideology and by June 1987 the Business Roundtable launched a campaign against the 
new Act.89 Greenslade ,90 then Legal Adviser to the New Zealand Employers' Federation 
(NZEF) , attacked the notion of a separate labour law jurisdiction and claimed:91 
The reason there are any jobs at all , whether in employment or contracting, is that some people 
called "consumers" want, and are prepared to pay for , some goods and services. Such work is the 
only reason for jobs . All other so-called "work" is disguised welfare. It is the function (not the 
"right ", but rather the "duty") of management to meet consumer demand, and to do so as 
efficiently and effectively as possible . One of the ways for management to meet consumer demand 
is to organise labour productively and strengthen its muscle and mind with capital and motivation. 
These rather religious expressions of the primacy of the market were reinforced when 
the Business Roundtable invited Epstein to New Zealand to press the case for a general 
law model. 92 The Business Roundtable also commissioned a Heylen research poll in 
February 1988 which purported to show strong public support for enterprise bargaining , 
voluntary unionism, union contestability and politically independent unions:93 
Mr R Barker, Secretary of the Service Workers Federation, dismissed the figures as "rubbish " and 
entirely predictable , because asking the Roundtable to commission a poll on trade unions was 
equivalent to the Master Butchers Association sponsoring a poll on vegetarianism. 
also Ryan and Walsh _"Common Law v Labour Law" 235 - 238 ; Deeks et al Labour and Employment 
Relations 82 - 84. 
87 This summary of Epstein's view is contained in M Street "The Future of the Employment Court and 
Tribunal: the Labour Party's View" (NZIIRR Seminar) 3. 
88 Ryan and Walsh "Common Law v Labour Law" 235 . 
89 Freedom in Employment (NZBRT report, June 1987) advocated decentralised wage bargaining and 
greater flexibility as an "urgent national priority" . The then Minister of Labour, Hon S Rodger, described 
these views as "extreme": H Roth "Chronicle" (1987) 12 NZJIR 138 - 139. 
90 B Greenslade "Strikes, Injunctions and Compliance Orders: the Labour Relations Act 1987" ( 1988) 13 
NZJIR 63 . 
91 Above 76. 
92 Ryan and Walsh "Common Law v Labour Law" 235 . 
93 H Roth "Chronicle" (1988) 13 NZJIR 107. 
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In 1990 Brook published Freedom at Work94 criticising the then ideological basis of 
labour law. Brook's approach, modelled on Epstein's, recognised no inequality m 
bargaining power between employers and workers95 and required the removal of statute-
based employment law and specialist employment institutions to enforce it. Brook 
argued for a return to common law principles, which, she argued, were more flexible, 
effective, fair and practical than statutory systems of labour law: 96 
An important aspect of the common law's success is its heavy reliance on . . . 'adverbial' rules; 
prohibitions or procedures that tell individuals not what to do but how to do things . The emphasis 
is thus not on outcomes .. . but on just process . Accordingly, 'equity' is, in the fust instance, 
measured not by outcomes but by treatment. 
The 1990 National Party manifesto did not overtly endorse the Business Roundtable view 
that the specialist employment institutions were unnecessary, but did promise a review of 
the need for those institutions. 97 In the period between National' s 1990 election victory, 
and the passing of the ECA on 7 May 1991, an "intense policy debate", 98 largely 
between government officials, took place on the need for specialist institutions. While 
the Business Roundtable view on freedom of negotiation prevailed, the battle over the 
need to retain both the specialist institutions and the personal grievance and dispute 
resolution procedures was won by Justice and Labour Department officials. 99 
3 The Ideology of the ECA 
Initially both supporters and opponents of the ECA tended to portray it as one-
dimensional, recognising only the principle of freedom of contract100 and eschewing 
protectionist principles: 1 o 1 
The agenda of the new right, as expounded by the Business Round Table has been implemented almost 
in its entirety in the Employment Contracts Act. In implementing this agenda the [A]ct uses terms such 
as freedom of association and freedom of contract with which lawyers will no doubt feel familiar and 
comfortable . However in order to really understand the [A]ct it must be understood that terms such as 
94 Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1990. Brook was at that time an economist with the NZBRT. 
95 Above, 17 - 20. 
96 Above, 97 - 98 . 
97 Ryan and Walsh "Common Law v Labour Law" 243. 
98 Above. 
99 Above, 244. Ryan and Walsh analyse the reasons why the Government decided to retain the specialist 
institutions at 254 - 255. 
lOO A Study of the Labour/Employment Court(NZBRTINZEF, December 1992) (i). See also New Zealand 
Law Society Seminar Employment Contracts Act Revisited (NZLS, April/May 1992, Leaders P Churchman 
and W Grills) 5. 
IOI New Zealand Law Society Seminar, above, 3. A submission based on this view was rejected by Goddard 
CJ in October 1993 in Service Workers Union of Aotearoav Southern Hotel Corporation (NZ) Ltd[l993] 2 
ERNZ 513, 526 - 527: see Part IV. 
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these are no longer legal terms of art but must be interpreted embracing the neoclassical nuances which 
are integral to the working of the [A]ct itself. 
Recent analyses have emphasised that the ECA is more complex. While the bargaining 
provisions of the ECA are extremist 102 in terms of their failure to provide expressly 103 
for any sort of "good faith bargaining" requirements on employers, employees, and 
unions, Parliament recognised the need for an element of protectionism in labour laws 104 
by retaining a specialist court and tribunal, a broadly available personal grievance 
procedure, and a "minimum code" of wages and employment conditions, with a statutory 
enforcement system (the Labour Inspectorate). 105 Thus the ECA is a compromise 
"between an acceptance of the ideology of market regulation and the realities of the 
employment relationship" , 106 between freedom of contract and the requirements of 
fairness and protection for workers. Wailes' analysis emphasises freedom of 
association: 107 
The division of the ECA into a "neo-conservative" section (Parts I & II) and a pluralistic section 
(Parts III and IV) seems to have gained currency because of its neatness in analytical terms. 
However , this approach is misleading . In fact the emphasis on freedom of association rather than 
freedom of contract in Part I of the Act represents a substantial moderation to Epstein' s model 
which has not attracted any attention in the critical literature . 
Brook Cowen agrees that "[t]he Act places primary emphasis on freedom of association -
its role in promoting freedom of contract is implicit rather than explicit. "108 In 1991 , 
however, this emphasis was not so clearly perceived. There had been little academic 
discussion in New Zealand or in other common law jurisdictions of the common law of 
employment, which had developed little since 1894. The judges were faced with a 
radical departure from previous statute law and new legislation which incorporated 
conflicting policy principles . 
The failure to make the underlying principles of the ECA explicit in the wording of the 
legislation meant that the courts were deciding cases in a jurisprudential and theoretical 
vacuum. This meant that the political and ideological climate which existed when the 
102 Even South Africa adopted laws against unfair labour practices in 1979: see C Thompson "Borrowing 
and Bending: The Development of South Africa's Unfair Labour Practice Jurisprudence" [I 993] Int J Comp 
Lab L & Ind Relations 183 . See also ILO Conventions 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise) 1948 and 98 (Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining) 1949. 
1 o3 See Part IV . 
104 Mazengarb's Employment Law para 1018 pp 8 /28 - 8 /30. 
l05 ECAss 141 -145 . SeealsoPBrookCowen,aboven81, 75-79. 
106 Deeks et al Labour and Employment Relations 88. 
107 N Wailes "The Case Against Specialist Jurisdiction for Labour Law: The Philosophical Assumptions of 
a Common Law for Labour Relations" ( I 994) 19 NZJIR 1, 2 n 1. 
108 Above n 81 , 76. 
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ECA came into operation greatly influenced early judicial interpretations of the Act. 109 
In the first two years of the ECA' s operation the National Government reactivated the 
New Right revolution and accelerated the deregulation process which had been 
temporarily stalled by the call in 1988 of the Prime Minister, Rt Hon D Lange, for a 
"cuppa. "110 In 1991, then, the political values of the New Right permeated public life. 
For this reason the principle of freedom of association was given little prominence by the 
courts until late in 1993, when the political and ideological climate changed. 111 
109 New Zealand Law Society Seminar, above n 100, I - 6. 
I 10 James New Territory 276. 
111 See the comments of Colgan J inNZPSA v Designpower NZ Ltd[1992] 1 ERNZ 669,681 - 682, that s 5 
was an interpretative or objects section and its effect was not substantive and the commentary in 
Mazengarb's Employment Law para 63.8 pp A/919 - A/924. See also NZ Meat Workers Union v Richmond 
Ltd[I992] 3 ERNZ 643. This point is discussed further in Part IV ofthis paper. 
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II JUDGES AND THE POLITICS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
A Measuring Judicial Politics: Three Benchmarks 
1 Introduction 
In 1908 miners at Blackball went on strike to get longer crib (meal time) underground. 
At other collieries crib was 30 minutes. At Blackball it was only 15 minutes. In his 
account of the rise of the United Federation of Labour, Red Fed Memoirs, Pat Hickey, 
one of the strike leaders, describes the manner in which a fine of 75/l (75 percent of the 
maximum penalty) was imposed by the Arbitration Court on the union for striking: 112 
I have a vivid recollection of the Court scene. About thirty miners attended as witnesses, each 
with a red ribbon in his coat and the majority wearing red ties as well. I well remember the gleam 
in "his Honour's" eye and the frown upon his face as the witnesses entered the box. To this day I 
feel convinced that the severity of the fine was due as much to the prevalence of our red ties and 
ribbons as it was to the crime. 
An interesting incident occurred during the hearing of this case, which we afterwards used with 
much effect. Our solicitor, the late Sir A R Guinness, in addressing the Court, referred to the 
"crib" time allowance of fifteen minutes as being altogether too short; his Honour remarked with 
a frown that he thought fifteen minutes ample time. He then glanced at the clock, noticed that the 
time was 12.30, and stated that the Court stood adjourned for lunch till 2 p.m. 
Compare the more recent description of Italian judicial militancy by Professor Mancini, 
and in particular the left-wing current of Italian judges, Magistratura democratica: I 13 
Take the division of the Milan Tribunal handling labour disputes. For years it has been a fief of 
Magistratura democratica. Its liege lords were perfectly decent and hard-working people under 
whose sway the length of cases from complaint to decision was kept down - a miracle in Italy - to 
a period of three to six months. For an employer, however, to emerge from their hands as winner 
was harder than for a camel to go through the eye of a needle. 
Between these two extremes, establishing points of reference from which judicial politics 
can be analysed is problematic. In presenting a European perspective on the politics of 
judges, 114 Professor Mancini had to leave English judges out of his analysis: 115 
112 PH Hickey "Red" Fed Memoirs (Wellington Media Collective, reprint undated) 13 . 
113 Professor G F Mancini (Professor of Law, University of Bologna) "Politics and the Judges - The 
European Perspective" (Eighth Chorley Lecture, 13 June 1979, London School of Economics and Political 
Science) (1980) 43 MLR 1, 17. Note also the recent dispute between the Italian Prime Minister, S Berlusconi 
and the Milan Magistrates over their role in corruption cases: "Judges Blasted by PM" (The Evening Post, 
Wellington, 16 July 1994) 7. 
114 In this paper the term "politics" refers to a world outlook or ideology, rather than party political views. 
This paper discusses the politics of judges of the CA, EC and HC only. 
115 See Mancini 2. 
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Like anywhere else, English judicial decisions may be politically motivated; but their authors, I 
take it, would never dream of publicly acknowledging this fact or acting in such a way as to make 
it explicit in the eyes of even lay observers. In other words, all the researcher is left with is 
cogent or loose, but definitely cool legal reasoning and obiter dicta: not much, let us face it, to 
warrant the formulation of sharp political conclusions in a system where the words of the law are 
not empty vessels for the judge to fill. 
Mancini's observation applies equally with respect to the attitudes of the New Zealand 
judiciary to employment law issues; with little or no hard data there is room for not 
much more than "inklings and hints. "4 For this reason the divergent political approaches 
of the Employment Court and Court of Appeal are considered through an analysis of the 
"cool legal reasoning and obit er dicta" in the three cases discussed in Part III of this 
paper. The judicial politics apparent in those cases are discussed with reference to three 
benchmarks. The first benchmark is Griffith' s analysis of the judiciary as the supporters 
of the economically and politically powerful in society rather than as the upholders of 
right against might. The second benchmark is the extent of judicial promotion of the 
essentially anti-worker principles of the common law of employment. The third 
benchmark is the degree of judicial enthusiasm for the New Right revolution and its free 
market ethos. It is recognised that these points of reference, described below, can be 
criticised. However for the reasons noted by Mancini any measure of judicial politics in 
New Zealand will of necessity involve the adoption of somewhat arbitrary and subjective 
benchmarks. 116 
2 Protecting the powerful: Griffith 's analysis 
(a) Griffith' s analysis 
According to Professor Griffith's case-based analysis of the English judiciary117 the 
principal functions of judges are firstly to maintain law and order and secondly to protect 
individuals against governmental power .118 Griffith says that in determining the limits of 
governmental powers and individual rights, judges make decisions on the basis of their 
perception of the public interest. What is or is not in the public interest is "a political 
question which admits of a great variety of answers. "119 Griffith says that judges, in 
tailoring their views to take account of the public interest, promote certain political, 
116 On the difficulties of analysing judges and judicial politics see Davidson The Judiciary and Employment 
Law 3 - 5. 
117 JAG Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary (4 ed, Fontana Press, London, 1991) (hereafter Griffith). JA 
G Griffith is Emeritus Professor of Public Law in the University of London. His analysis was first published 
amidst great controversy in I 977 . 
118 Above, 270. 
119 Above, 275. 
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conservative views, including the promotion of certain general economic aims.120 They 
do so not in any conscious or deliberate way 121 but perceptibly: 122 
[T]heir interpretation of what is in the public interest and therefore politically desirable is 
determined by the kind of people they are and the position they hold in our society; ... this 
position is part of established authority and so is necessarily conservative and illiberal. From all 
this flows that view of the public interest which is shown in judicial attitudes such as tenderness 
towards private property and dislike of trade unions, strong adherence to the maintenance of order, 
distaste for minority opinions, demonstrations and protests, the avoidance of conflict with 
Government policy even where it is manifestly oppressive of the most vulnerable, support of 
governmental secrecy, concern for the preservation of the moral and social behaviour to which it 
is accustomed, and the rest. 
In Griffith' s view the perception that judges are "alert to protect the individual against 
the power of the State" is a myth.123 Although they will intervene to help the weakest 
members of society, for example in immigration cases, "minority groups, especially if 
they demonstrate or protest in ways which cause difficulty or embarrassment" 124 are 
unlikely to be supported by the judges. Rather than being neutral in the conflicts which 
arise between those who control the existing institutions and those who challenge those 
institutions, the judiciary has always supported the powerful in society: 125 
Law and order, the established distribution of power both public and private, the conventional and 
agreed view amongst those who exercise political and economic power, the fears and prejudices of 
the middle and upper classes , these are the forces which the judges are expected to uphold and do 
uphold. 
In the societies of our world today judges do not stand out as protectors of liberty, of the rights of 
man, of the unprivileged, nor have they insisted that holders of great economic power, private or 
public, should use it with moderation. 
(b) The New Zealand judiciary 
Little has been written about the politics of New Zealand's judges .126 "[T] he good 
manners characterising the British intellectual debate" 127 also tend to preclude open 
discussion of the politics of the New Zealand judiciary .128 The politics of judges in other 
120 Above, 327. 
121 Above, 3 I 7. 
122 Above, 319. 
123 Above, 282. 
124 Above. 
125 Above, 328. 
126 One of the few articles is G H Rosenberg "The Politics of the Judiciary" (1971 - 1973) 6 VUWLR 141. 
See also "Judging the Judges"-(LawTalk, Newsletter of the New Zealand Law Society, No 422, 19 September 
1994) 3. 
127 Mancini 2. 
128 A short paper by Sir Thomas Eichelbaum "Political Influences in the Legal Profession . Judicial 
Independence - Fact or Fiction" (NZ Law Conference Papers Vol 2 (March 1993, Wellington) 120 - 123) 
notes (122 - 123) with approval that there is no overt party political involvement in judicial appointments . 
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jurisdictions are discussed, analysed, disapproved of, endorsed and taken for granted. 129 
The unspoken, conventional wisdom is that New Zealand judges do not have political 
views; or if they do, they do not let those views influence their decision-making. The 
writer accepts the accuracy of this conventional wisdom with respect to the party politics 
of judges, but not with respect to their world view. 
Griffith says that judges of the higher courts in England have "by their education and 
training and the pursuit of their profession as barristers, acquired a strikingly 
homogeneous collection of attitudes, beliefs and principles, which to them represent the 
public interest. 130 Mancini says that "English judges seldom make decisions of a nature 
to challenge a universally received notion of the public interest; and . . . when they 
happen to do it, their decisions are a result of strictly individual options ." 131 It is 
submitted that these comments are also true of New Zealand's High Court and Court of 
Appeal judges. Certainly New Zealand judges tend to have similar backgrounds: 132 
[T]he person appointed to be a Judge in New Zealand in the years since the Second World War is 
a middle aged Caucasian male; he is well-educated; and he is a successful and prominent 
member of the legal profession and, as such, is almost certainly wealthy, a member of the upper-
middle class, and lives in an urban environment. 
This analysis made in 1974 appears to remain largely true today, notwithstanding the 
appointment of one woman judge and one judge from an academic background to the 
High Court. 133 In contrast to the English judiciary, however, of whom only 1. 3 percent 
could be said to have a working class background, in 1974 "approximately 25 percent of 
New Zealand judges could be assigned to the 'working class', ie their fathers were 
craftsmen or unskilled workers." 134 The general picture is unlikely to have changed 
significantly since 1974. The views of the New Zealand judiciary are not the same as 
those of their English counterparts, as shown by the development of an indigenous 
jurisprudence in many areas .135 It seems fair to say that the New Zealand judiciary has 
been influenced by the more egalitarian nature of New Zealand society and the position 
of Maori as tangata whenua, but in the writer's view Griffith's analysis remains largely 
true of New Zealand's Court of Appeal and High Court judges. 
The 1993 New Zealand Law Conference had as its theme "The Law and Politics" yet there was almost no 
discussion of the politics of the New Zealand judiciary. 
129 See eg S Lee Judging Judges (Faber and Faber Ltd, London, 1988) I 82 - 194. A recent example of 
judicial politics is T Morrison (ed) Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power. Essays on Anita Hill, Clarence 
Thomas, and the Construction of Reality (Chatto and Windus, London, 1993). 
130 Griffith 275. 
131 Mancini2. 
132 J E Hodder "Judicial Appointments in New Zealand" [1974] NZLJ 80, 85. 
133 Cartwright J (initially appointed 22 June 1993) and Hammond J (appointed 14 July I 991 ). 
134 Above n 132, 84. 
135 See eg S Baldwin "New Zealand's National Legal Identity" (1989) 4 Canterbury LR I 73. 
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While judges of the Employment Court have similar backgrounds to judges of the 
general courts, 136 their specialist jurisdiction gives them a broader and deeper 
appreciation of the nature of the employment relationship, the inequality present in that 
relationship, and the differences between employment contracts and other commercial 
contracts: "it may be that the factual nature of employment disputes is such that those 
deciding such cases require a specialist knowledge of the area and a practical experience 
that can best be achieved by wide and continued exposure to cases in the area." m A 
Ministerial briefing paper prepared by the Department of Labour in January 1991 noted 
that "[b]y contrast, the average occupants of the judicial bench ... have little knowledge 
of the realities of the workplace and the on-going nature of the employment 
relationship." 138 
(c) The limits of Griffith's analysis 
Griffith' s critics have portrayed his analysis as "destructive" 139 and a simplistic 
"nightmare" in which the outcome of cases can be automatically predicted by assessing 
the class background of the presiding judge. 140 This portrayal is not accurate; Griffith 
accepts that in cases where the law is certain judges simply decide disputes in accordance 
with the law and impartially .141 Griffith' s· rejection of the notion of an impartial 
judiciary is the result of an analysis of cases in which judges must determine what the 
public interest is, or what policy principles should apply, because statutes or the common 
law give inadequate or imprecise guidance. The ECA is such a statute; it contains 
broad, conflicting principles which require judges to be law-makers. The politics of 
New Zealand judges may be measured by the extent to which, in making law, they apply 
principles which reflect the conservative views summarised by Griffith. 142 
l36 M Lambert (ed) Who's Who in New Zealand(I2 ed, Reed Books, Auckland, 1991). Almost all the EC 
judges practised employment law to some extent before appointment. Some were leading industrial lawyers. 
There are no women judges of the EC. Goddard CJ said in I 993 that the next three appointments to the EC 
should be women ("The Role of the Employment Court", NZIIRR Seminar, 6). 
137 G Anderson "Specialist Employment Law and Specialist Institutions" (NZIIRR Seminar) 5. This paper 
argues that a divergent approach is now apparent in the decision-making of the CA and EC. The questionwhy 
CA and EC judges take divergent approaches is an interesting one. However, beyond acknowledging the 
nature of specialist courts, for the reasons noted by Mancini, any answers can be speculative only. 
138 Department of Labour Employment Contracts Bill: Outstanding Policy Decisions(Paper to the Minister 
of Labour, 29 January I 991) 3. The paper also noted (6) that "[i]n past years, when some of the jurisdiction 
which the Labour Court now possesses was exercised by the courts of general jurisdiction, there were 
examples of injunctions issued by the court being ignored, thus exacerbating the disruptive influence of the 
initial dispute." 
139 S Lee Judging Judges (Faber and Faber Ltd, London, I 988) I 99. 
140 Above, 4 and 33 - 39. 
141 Griffith269-271. 
142 Above, 274 - 275 . Mancini (2) says: "I am not overly sympathetic to the philosophy which Mr Minogue 
displays in reviewing Professor Griffith's book for the Times Literary Supplement; but his suggestion that it 
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3 Upholding the Common Law 
(a) The English judiciary and the common law of employment 
The second benchmark used in the case analysis in Part III is the extent to which judges 
have resorted to common law principles in deciding cases, because "the common law is 
the creature of the judges , and has always been able to be identified with a distinctive 
political view of the world." 143 Modern judicial attitudes to workers cannot be analysed 
without regard to development of the common law of employment in England. The 
fundamental principles of the common law of employment are part of "an unbroken line 
of evolution from the medieval institution of villeinage through to the employment 
relationship of the present day . . . . "144 "A master had a proprietary interest in his 
servant - the servitium - and could sue a third party for wrongful injury to the servant on 
the basis of injury to that proprietary interest. "145 The Master and Servant Acts made a 
servant's breach of the contract of service eg by leaving employment without permission 
a crime punishable by imprisonment. 146 Although the last of these Acts was repealed in 
the 1870s , and employment as a status relationship was gradually replaced by 
employment as a contractual relationship, the inequality inherent in the master and 
servant relationship did not disappear , but was adapted judicially to a new legal form. 
Victorian judges simply incorporated the status concept of service into "the empty boxes 
of the contract clauses" .147 As Wedderburn points out:148 
Even in the heyday of laissez-faire, the substantive content of the relationship reflected the 
extensive obligations of the pre-industrial servant and the command power of the master. As Fox 
has argued: 'contract, as the pure doctrine defined it, could not be seen by the property-owning 
classes as an adequate foundation for governing the employment relation. Their needs were met 
by infusing the employment contract with the traditional law of master and servant, thereby 
granting them a legal basis for the prerogative they demanded . ' 
would be improper to put a conservative label on a given court because of a string of anti-union decisions, 
seems to me entirely correct. Much depends, of course, on just how long the string is. If its length is 
reasonable, the stance taken by the court may well result from the fact that union claims were faulty in law. 
My English colleagues have pointed out to me that this particular piece of string is about 200 years long; and 
I leave it to them to decide its reasonableness ." 
143 Davidson The Judiciary and Emp!oy"ment Law 203 . 
144 Above, 8. 
145 Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, R Lewis and J Clark (eds)Labour Law and Industrial Relations: Building 
on Kahn-Freund (Clarendon Press , Oxford, I 983 ) 148 (hereafter Wedderburn et al Building on Kahn-Freund. 
146 Mazengarb's Employment Law para 1.1 p A/1; Wedderburn et al, above, 148 - 149. 
147 A Fox Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations(Faber and Faber Ltd, London, 1974) quoted 
in Lord Wedderburn The Worker and the Law (3 ed, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1986) 111 (hereafter 
Wedderburn The Worker and the Law. 
148 Wedderburn et al Building on Kahn-Freund 146. 
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The hostility of English judges to trade union organisation and collective action has been 
analysed by many writers. 149 The judiciary has been accused of "subverting legislative 
measures which favour the interests of labour in order to protect the interests of 
capital . " 15° For example when the UK Parliament decriminalised collective action and 
trade union organisation in the second half of the nineteenth century , the judges 
responded by imposing civil liability on individuals and trade unions involved in 
industrial action.151 When Parliament provided statutory immunity from civil action for 
industrial action "in furtherance of trade disputes", 152 the judges undermined this 
statutory immunity at intervals throughout the twentieth century through the revival of 
the economic torts of intimidation, conspiracy, and inducement of breach of contract.153 
Thus "with less than a handful of exceptions English judges - certainly the Law Lords -
have not during two centuries delivered any judgments encouraging the spread of trade 
unionism and thereby collective bargaining ." 154 
Perhaps because of judicial hostility to collective organisation, industrial relations and 
collective bargaining in England this century have existed largely outside any statutory 
legal framework ; wages and working conditions have been set by collective 
agreements .155 Wedderburn's statement that "[m]ost workers want nothing more of the 
149 Davidson The Judiciary and Employment Law; P Davies and M Freed)andKahn-Freund's Labour and 
the Law (3 ed, Stevens and Co, London, 1983); Griffith; Wedderburn The Worker and the Law; M J 
Klarman "The Judges Versus the Unions: The Development of British Labor Law 1867 - 1913" (1989) 75 
Virginia LR 1487. 
150 H Collins "Capitalist Discipline and Corporatist Law" (1982) 11 ILJ 78, 80. 
151 Wedderburn The Worker and the Law 17. 
152 The Trade Disputes Act 1906 (and later amendments: see Wedderburn The Worker and the Law 35 - 47. 
153 This process is discussed in Wedderburn The Worker and the Law Chapter 1. In 1979 and 1980 even as 
the House of Lords reluctantly reaffirmed the protections of the immunities for action taken in furtherance of 
a trade dispute, (Lord Diplock commented in Express Newspapers Ltd v MacShane [ 1980] I All ER 65 , 73 
that the correct application of the law on immunities "tended to stick in judicial gorges") they called for 
reform of the law. In Duport Steel Ltdv Sirs [1980] I All ER 529 Lord Scarman (at 554) even gave some 
drafting instructions to assist with the passage of the 1980 Employment Act which Parliament was at that time 
deliberating on : "If the law is unacceptable, the remedy lies with Parliament, not the judges. And if 
Parliament is minded to amend the statute, I would suggest that, instead of seeking to close what Lord 
Wilberforce has aptly called "open-ended expressions" .. . , the draftsman should be bold and tackle his 
problems head on . If he is to put a limitation on the immunities ins 13 , let him do so by limiting the heads of 
tortious liability where immunity is conferred; if he is to strengthen the availability of interlocutory relief in 
industrial relations, let )lim include clear guidelines in the statute. And, if he is to limit secondary or tertiary 
blacking or picketing, the statute must declare whose premises may, or may not, be picketed and how far the 
blacking or picketing may extend. 'Open-ended expressions' will bring the judges inevitably back into the 
industrial arena exercising a discretion which may well be misunderstood by many and which can damage 
confidence in the administration of justice ." 
154 Wedderburn et al Building on Kahn-Freund 170, 171 . Wedderburn says that English judges conformed to 
the spirit of statutes governing labour law in England only when the legislation became overtly hostile to 
unions and collective bargaining following the election of a Conservative Government in 1979. See also 
Wedderburn "Freedom of Association" 28 . 
155 Mazengarb's Employment Law para 1.1 p A/2 notes that this is still the case. 
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law than that it should leave them alone" 156 summarised the attitude that the success of 
English labour law could be measured by the extent to which industrial relations could 
be kept out of the courts .157 In New Zealand, by contrast, it was the comprehensive 
nature of statutory regulation of industrial relations which made any significant judicial 
departure from the protectionist principles of the legislation impossible. Within these 
different systems of industrial relations the common law of employment did not develop 
markedly in either New Zealand or England between the late nineteenth century and the 
passing of the ECA.158 
(b) The ideology of the common law of employment 
Statute-based labour law proceeds on the basis that worker protection is essential to deal 
with the disparity in bargaining power between the individual worker and the 
employer .159 Judges have built the common law of commercial contracts on the principle 
that the parties are in a (relatively) equal bargaining position. 160 Likewise the common 
law of employment recognises no such inequality of bargaining power: 161 
The common law . . . ignores any disequilibrium of power which results from normal social 
relations , as distinct from abnormal personal conditions (infancy, mental disorder). It ignores the 
realities of social constraint and of economic power: it did so even at a time when the employer 
was and the worker was not in a position to invoke the aid of the criminal law, to say nothing of 
the threat of the workhouse; the worker's obligation to obey the lawful commands given by 
management and the employer's obligation to remunerate the worker are contractual obligations 
freely incurred among individuals . 
Kahn-Freund described the individual contract of employment as "a command under the 
guise of an agreement" and an "act of submission", because "the individual worker 
brings no equality of bargaining power to the labour market and to this transaction 
central to his life whereby the employer buys his labour power." 162 Although, as 
Kaufman J said in Foley v Interactive Data Corporation , 163 he could think of "no 
relationship in which one party , the employee, places more reliance upon the other, is 
156 Wedderburn The Worker and the Law I. 
157 Above, 9. 
158 Mazengarb's Employment Law para 1 : I p A/2. 
159 P Davies and M Freedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law, above n 149, 34. 
160 D Kairys (ed) The Politics of Law: ,1 Progressive Critique(Pantheon Books, New York, 1982) Chapter 8 
"Contract Law as Ideology" 172 - 184; New Zealand Law Commission Unfair Contracts (Preliminary Paper 
No 11 , Wellington, 1990) paras 42 - 45 pp 15 - 16. See also P S Atiyah "Contract and Fair Exchange" in P S 
Atiyah Essays on Contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986); J F Burrows, J Finn and S M D Todd Cheshire 
and Fifoot's Law of Contract (8 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1992) 23 - 24. 
161 P Davies and M Freedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law, above n 149, 35. 
162 Wedderburn The Worker and the Law 5. 
163 254 Cal Rptr 211 , 253 (Cal 1988, Supreme Court of California) cited by R Wilson (Vice President, NZ 
Council of Trade Unions) "Employment Contracts Act: Do the Courts Need to Act to Protect Workers?" 
(1993 NZ Law Conference Papers, Vol 2, 2 - 5 March 1993, Wellington) 378. 
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more dependent on the other, or is more vulnerable to abuse by the other, than the 
relationship between employer and employee ... ", judges also consistently refused to 
extend the law of unfair and unconscionable bargains to the area of employment law. 164 
The courts are reluctant to "pierce the veil of equality" and no court has ever invalidated 
a contract of employment by reason of gross exploitation: 165 
Nothing is more misleading than the ambiguity of the word "freedom" in labour relations . By 
restraining the power of management over the individual worker the law limits the range of the 
worker's duty to obey rules made by management. Protective legislation thus enlarges the 
worker's freedom, his freedom to give priority to his own and his family's interests over those of 
his employer. Yet paradoxically, such liberating legislation must appear to the lawyer as a 
restraint on freedom, on the "freedom of contract" which in this context is the term the law uses 
for the subjection of the worker to the power of management . . . . 
To the extent that the common law of employment treats people in unequal positions as 
equals , it is an essentially partisan law, favouring the interests of employers over 
workers. But the common law goes beyond simple ignorance of this inequality; it 
further disadvantages workers through the judicially implied terms of the employer's 
right to manage and the employee's duty to obey . Paradoxically these implied terms 
incorporate inequality into a contract which is ostensibly between equals . Attempts to 
redress the inequality inherent in the employment relationship through collective 
organisation have met with judicial hostility166 even though collective bargaining is 
generally recognised as being the most effective method of redressing this power 
imbalance. 167 From a market perspective, group activity "disturb[s] the order of the 
market and of the property relations .. . seen as sacrosanct by the common law ." 168 
Discussing the statutory "tilt" against union organisation in the United States , Weiler 
notes: 169 
Actually , that tilt has its roots in the common law background of the NLRA : the tacit legal 
assumption that the "natural" status for a workplace is nonunion, with management exercising on 
behalf of the shareholder-owners the prerogatives of property and contract law to establish the 
164 J J Macken, G McCarry and C Sappideen The Law of Employment (3 ed, The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 
1990) 435 . See also Wedderburn The Worker and the Law 142 - 144; J Cartwright Unequal Bargaining: A 
Study of Vitiating Factors in the Formation of Contracts(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991 ). See also Davies v 
Dulux (NZ) Ltd [1986) 2 NZLR 218 . 
165 p Davies and M Fr~edland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law above n 36 and 24 . 
166 See Part IC2 . 
167 This is recognised in Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), including Convention 
No 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise) and Convention No 98 (Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining). See also P C Weiler Governing the Workplace. The Future of Labour 
and Employment Law (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990), especially the summary 
at 184 - 185. 
168 Wedderburn "Freedom of Association" 12. 
169 p C Weiler Governing the Workplace. The Future of Labor and Employment Law(Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990) 228. 
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firm's terms and conditions of employment, constrained only by the parameters of an unorganised 
and unfettered labor market. 
A legal framework which ignores the inequality between employer and employee and 
proceeds on the assumptions of the inviolability of private ownership, the prerogative of 
management to organise and distribute work, and the subordinate status of the worker, 170 
shows "a certain bias" 171 and will produce outcomes which are disadvantageous to 
employees generally .172 
(c) The Common Law: a secret umpire 
Several writers have placed this bias in employment law in the context of a more general 
bias of the common law. Wedderburn says that "[t]he rights of private property are the 
natural base of the common law, just as they are the core of Hayekism. Both treat its 
legitimacy as an indisputable foundation of the core of the social order. "173 Sachs and 
Wilson, in their 1978 study Sexism and the Law, put the view that the common law is a 
tool through which judges engage in social engineering: 174 
The main instrument that the judges had been using to assert the interests of men against women 
and of employers against workers was the common law . The common law tradition has so 
frequently been associated with concepts of fundamental right and justice that it is at first startling 
to find that it was used as the main doctrinal justification for preventing the advancement of 
working people of both sexes, notably in conspiracy cases, and of women of the middle and upper 
classes , primarily in the male monopoly cases . .. . 
What maintained continuity between the idea of the common law over the centuries was that it · 
continued to be the instrument of the judges and to express in a vigorous if indirect form the 
interest of the social group with whom the judges were associated. The fundamental rights of the 
English people thus amounted to little more than the fundamental rights of the judges, and chief 
amongst these was the right to determine how social claims should be legally classified and what 
procedures should be followed for their enforcement. 
170 Ryan and Walsh "Common Law v Labour Law" 240 quoting Lord Wedderburn of Charlton "Labour Law: 
Autonomy from the Common Law?" (1988) 9 Comp Lab LJ 219. 
17 1 The origin of this phrase is explained in J Hughes "Personal Grievances" in R Harbridge (ed)Employment 
Contracts: New Zealand Experiences (V.ictoria University Press, Wellington, 1993) 89, 128. 
172 H Collins discusses the nature of power in employment relationships in "Market Power, Bureaucratic 
Power and the Contract of Employment" ( 1986) 15 ILJ I. 
173 Wedderburn "Freedom of Association" 12. The Webbs pointed out what some judges have never 
accepted: "To men dependent for their daily existence on continuous employment, the protection of this 
means of livelihood from confiscation or encroachment appears as fundamental a basis of the social order as it 
does to owners of land" (Sand B Webb Industrial Democracy 566, cited in B Reiter and J Swan (eds)Studies 
in Contract Law (Carswell , Toronto, 1987) 315). 
174 A Sachs & J H Wilson Sexism and the Law. A Study of Male Beliefs and Legal Bias in Britain and the 
United States (Law in Society Series, Martin Robinson, Oxford, 1978) 43 - 44. 
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Wedderburn says that the vision behind the statutory removal of protections for workers 
and unions in the UK between 1980 and 1988:175 
[F]its hand in glove with that mixture of individualism and artificially enforced, spontaneous social 
order which has often characterised the dominant strain of philosophy propounded by English 
common lawyers , with the "half-conscious belief, " as Laski put it , that the "Common Law 
provides , so to say, a law behind the law which is enacted by Parliament" - a secret umpire in 
place behind the bench to protect its version of the social equilibrium. 
(d) Alternative principles 
Judges can make decisions based on fairness and justice in employment law only if they 
move beyond the strict confines of the rules of the common law of commercial contracts 
and recognise that employment is more than a contract; it is also an economic and social 
relationship .176 The process of producing just outcomes in employment law requires the 
development and application of legal principles which recognise inequality and the 
importance of collective organisation in redressing that inequality . The extent to which 
judges contribute to the justice, or injustice, of industrial relations outcomes may be 
measured by the extent to which they are prepared to move beyond a common law 
contract framework in appropriate cases . This is the second benchmark against which 
the politics of judges is measured in this paper. 
4 The New Right revolution: supporting the free market 
The third benchmark for measuring the political attitudes of New Zealand judges 
towards workers is the degree of enthusiasm with which they embraced the underlying 
principles of the economic and social revolution which occurred in New Zealand 
between 1984 and 1993. Because the changes tended to benefit the more powerful , 177 
views on the desirability of the process of "rolling back the state" are an important 
indicator of politics. Griffith says that "[i]n both democratic and totalitarian societies, 
the judiciary has naturally served the prevailing political and economic forces . 
Politically, judges are parasitic. "178 Consistently with this thesis, judges in the general 
courts did not just recognise the changes brought by the free market revolution, they also 
embraced the principles of the new order with enthusiasm. Kelsey argues that the hands-
off approach of the judiciary to the reforms indicated support for those reforms. 
Taggart's analysis of the Court of Appeal decision in Auckland Electric Power Board v 
175 Wedderburn "Freedom of Association" 35 . 
I 76 H Collins "Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of Employment" ( I 986) 15 ILJ I. 
177 James New Territory 223 - 229 and 287 - 288 ; Kelsey Rolling Back the State 9 - 12, 333 - 346. 
178 Griffith 328. 
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Electricity Corp of NZ Ltd179 supports this thesis. Referring to Richardson J's comments 
that the balancing of social responsibility and profitability under s 4 of the State Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986 was "inherently unsuitable for judicial decision", 180 Taggart 
concludes: 181 
If this minimal supervision of the statutory requirement that S0Es are to have regard to the 
interests of the relevant communities is considered too intrusive then I suggest that objection has 
less to do with non-justiciability and more to do with ideological preference. 
During the 1980s there was much comment on increased judicial activism, based on 
mainly extra-judicial statements by some judges, notably the President of the Court of 
Appeal. 182 In 1989 Sir Robin Cooke was able to describe "a tendency to judicial 
glasnost" in New Zealand as follows: 183 
There is now a more open acknowledgement that deciding a new point may not be primarily a 
process of deduction; and that the search is rather for the solution that seems fair and just after 
balancing all the relevant considerations. Some lawyers, possibly many lawyers, find this 
disturbing. It affronts their sense of hope or ideal that the law exists apart from the individuals 
who make it. Probably lawyers of that school of thought would accept that at some stage the law 
was made by judges, but at least subconsciously they hold the belief that the time of all that has 
now very largely passed. They find plausible support for their position in the appeal to certainty. 
With hindsight these comments have an air of unreality about them. At the same time as 
Sir Robin Cooke felt able to say that in New Zealand "the ideal of fairness and a sense 
of what it requires in particular cases is quite strongly evident, 184 the Business 
Roundtable was calling for the removal of protectionist labour laws. And as he 
commented that "employment, however created, is increasingly seen as a relationship 
involving status; and the parties to the relationship owe duties to each other reflecting 
the status of each, which are at least very largely summed up as duties of fairness", 185 
the NZEF was calling for a return to the principles of freedom of contract in 
employment law. Kelsey concludes that the rhetoric of judicial activism "performed the 
important ideological and legitimating function of showing that the courts, or some of 
their members, were prepared to meet the challenges of the changing times . But it was 
the actual decision-making of the courts that was the real indicator of where the judicial 
179 8 September 1993, Court of Appeal , CA 45/93 (Richardson, McKay & Robertson JJ); [ 1993] BCL 318. 
180 Above, 15 - 16. 
181 M Taggart "State-Owned Enterprises and Social Responsibility: A Contradiction in Terms" [1993] NZ 
Recent LR 343, 355 . 
182 See the papers collected in M Taggart (ed) Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 1980s. 
Problems and Prospects (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1986). 
183 "Fairness" (1989) 19 VUWLR 421,422 (emphasis added). 
184 Above, 423 . 
185 Above, 428. 
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system stood. "186 Kelsey chronicles the failure of those who attempted to challenge 
judicially the progress of the revolution. 187 She concludes that the rise of judicial 
activism in the 1980s was "largely confined to judicial dicta" and that there is "little 
evidence of substantial judicial intervention in the restructuring process :" 188 
For all the talk of judicial activism, the courts maintained a largely formal , hands-off approach to 
government and executive power . 
. . . [T]here was very little evidence that the New Zealand courts were prepared actively to restrain 
the executive . They were as timid as they always had been. 
It is also no coincidence that the development of the fairness principle in administrative 
law took place before deregulation, during a period of extensive state involvement. 189 
The containment of state power is, of course , consistent with neo-classical economic and 
social theories. Once the process of "rolling back the state" was underway, the judges 
made it clear that new administrative law principles may need to be developed which 
would make for less judicial intervention in decision making processes of a public 
nature .190 
In employment law the politics of the judges may be measured by the extent to which 
their "ideological preference" has led them to promote the principles of free market 
economics beyond what is required by either s·tatute or common law principles . This is 
the third point of reference for the following analysis of cases . 
I 86 Kelsey Rolling Back the State 199. 
l87 Above Chapters 13 - 15 . 
188 Above, 199, 200, ~nd 204. According to Kelsey the Treaty cases fit this analysis also. Although in the 
Treaty cases the CA forced the Government to consult more fully in the process of privatisation and 
corporatisation of state assets, judicial decisions in no way challenged the merits of the process itself. This 
view is also shared by Sir William Wade; see the discussion of Wade's view and of the issue generally in PA 
Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zea/and(The Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney, 1993) 
656 - 660. See also J Fogarty "David v Goliath : The State of the Play of Judicial Review in the '90s" [ I 991] 
NZLJ 338. 
189 p A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zea/and(The Law Book Company Limited, 
Sydney, 1993) 657. 
19° Kelsey Rolling Back the State 206. 
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III THREE CASES 
A Introduction 
This part of the paper contains an analysis of three cases dealt with by the Labour and 
Employment Courts and the Court of Appeal between 1990 and 1993 with reference to the 
three benchmarks described in Part II. During this period the Business Roundtable 
criticised the Employment Court repeatedly for being "judicially activist". 191 As noted in 
Part IID3 the underlying principles of the ECA were not made explicit in the wording of 
the legislation. Thus the "inconsistencies and deficiencies" 192 in the ECA made substantial 
judicial development of employment Jaw principles inevitable. Anderson points out that 
the Business Roundtable's criticism stemmed less from its concern about the role of judges 
as law-makers and more from the perceived ideological direction of the Employment 
Court's decisions:193 
Claims of judicial activism are usually a complaint about the direction and not the process. Judicial 
"activism" may also just mean statutory interpretation. When a statute is drafted in broad general 
terms ... judicial development of the broad principles is inevitable and necessary for the law to 
operate. 
Contrary to the Business Roundtable/NZEF- view the Employment Court's approach 
remained reasonably consistent with the traditional approach of its predecessors. The 
Court of Appeal was more judicially active because its judgments incorporated into the 
jurisprudence the ideological and political changes of the New Right revolution. The cases 
discussed below are Wellington Caretakers etc JUOW v G N Hale & Sons Ltd, 194 where the 
courts were faced with a choice between two conflicting lines of authority; Attorney-
General v NZ Post Primary Teachers' Assn,195 where the Employment Court could be said 
to have been "judicially active" ; and TNT Worldwide Express (NZ) Ltd v Cunningham, 196 
where the Court of Appeal made new l.aw. 
191 All judges are req.uired to make law from time to time. S Lee Judging Judges (Faber and Faber Ltd, 
London, 1988) categorises those who criticise the process as being prone to "fairy tales, dreams and 
nightmares" (3) . . 
192 P Brook Cowen, above n 81 , 81. 
I 93 G Anderson "Further Reforms to Employment Law?" [ 1993] ELB 2. Anderson also said of the BRT: 
"They say the whole thing spould be regulated by the common law, but the only reason you've got common 
law at all is because you've had judicial activism. What they presumably mean is that they think the judicial 
activism should have stopped when they thought the law was right" : "Will the Employment Court Survive a 
Re-elected National Government?" (The independent, 26 March 1993 , 6, 8). 
194 Seebelown 197. 
195 [ 1991] 3 ERNZ 641 (EC); [ 1992] 2 NZLR 209 (CA). 
196 [1992] 1 ERNZ 956 (ET); [1992] 3 ERNZ 1030 (EC); [1993] 3 NZLR 681 (CA). 
32 
B Hale: The Right To Manage v The Right to Employment Security 
The Hale 197 cases examined the extent to which the courts could review the substantive 
justification for redundancy dismissals. Although they predate the ECA the decisions are 
suitable for analysis because they were made in the period leading up to the 1990 General 
Election during which reform of the labour market, the underlying principles of labour law, 
and the future of the employment institutions themselves were under intense debate, as was 
the future of the whole deregulation process. The decisions revealed a clear divergence in 
principle between the extent to which the Employment Court and the Court of Appeal 
respectively supported the competing principles of social justice and freedom of contract. 
The Court of Appeal decision also marked a clear break between its previous "hands off' 
approach to questions of labour law and the beginning of a more critical approach to the 
decisions of the specialist institutions. 
1 The first Labour Court judgment 
In 1989 G N Hale and Sons Ltd, a manufacturer of canopies for trucks and vans with 3 
plants in Auckland, Christchurch and Petone, suffered a decline in turnover and decided to 
introduce various cost-cutting measures. The cleaner, Mr Shrubshall, was made 
redundant. 198 The Labour Court was required to determine whether his dismissal was 
justified. Mr Shrubshall's union argued that the test for justification in these circumstances 
was whether dismissal was "necessary to ensure the continuing viability of the respondent's 
business" , 199 rather than simply being desirable from the point of view of the employer. 
The employer argued that, so long as it acted from genuine commercial motives in making 
an employee redundant, the court should not interfere in the decision. 
The employer's argument, based on the right to manage, was that the Labour Court could 
consider only whether the decision to dismiss was reasonable having regard to the 
commercial information available at the time and the result the employer was trying to 
achieve, and that the Court had no jurisdiction to decide whether the respondent could have 
197 Wellington etc Caretakers etc /VOW v G N Hale & Sons Ltd [ 1990] l NZILR 752 (LC 16 May 1990), 
hereafter referred to as LC l where necessary); G N Hale & Sons Ltdv Wellington etc Caretakers etc !VOW 
[ 1990] 2 NZILR I 079 (CA) (l l September 1990); and Wellington etc Caretakers etc /VOW v G N Hale & 
Son Ltd [1990] 3 NZILR 836 (LC) (LC 11 December 1990, hereafter referred to as LC 2 where necessary). 
The case was appealed from the LC to the CA then, following the CA's clarification of the relevant principles, 
remitted back to the LC for reconsideration. See the general discussion of these inMazengarb 's Employment 
law para 1205 pp B210- B 217 . 
198 A 5-week strike in support of a claim for a redundancy agreement followed; Mr Shrubshall's dismissal 
and a proposal to cancel the provision of free transport for workers were also probable factors in the decision 
to take industrial action: Hale [ 1990] I NZILR 752, 759 (LC I) . 
199 Above, 763 . 
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done better in the circumstances.200 The Labour Court began by emphasising the specialist 
nature of its personal grievance jurisdiction, citing the Court of Appeal decision in 
Wellington Road Transport Union v Fletcher Construction Co Ltd:201 
[D]espite the absence of any explicit statutory enlargement of the rights of workers in relation to 
dismissal the Arbitration Court in New Zealand has put a benevolent construction upon s 117 both as 
to the circumstances which might be recognised as supporting a worker's grievance related to a claim 
of unjustified dismissal and also the point at which the grievance should be resolved in his favour. 
And taking into account that the Industrial Relations Act has the important purpose of improving 
industrial relations ... I would not wish to derogate in any way from that general approach. Indeed s 
117 does not describe a process aimed at producing cut and dried answers to allegations which in the 
conventional Court setting would be the subject of pleadings together with formal claims and 
counterclaims . ... [W]ithin reasonable limits the Arbitration Court ought to be left, I think, to develop 
its own methods and processes in order to find the just and fair solutions intended by the Act. For 
such reasons recourse to technical legal language or the analogy of rules developed in the 
conventional courts will not always be particularly helpful in the present context. 
The Labour Court rejected any suggestion that a general appeal to "the right to manage" 
automatically prevented it from examining whether a dismissal for redundancy was 
justified:202 
[A]n argument based upon the employer's "right to manage" begs the question. The Court, in 
determining whether a dismissal has been unjustifiable, is concerned not with the undisputed 
existence of the right to manage but with the manner of its exercise in a particular case. 
The Labour Court emphasised the competing principle of job protection, referring to the 
Arbitration Court's decision in Maidstone Hardware ,203 in which the AC discussed its own 
earlier decision in the North/and Office & School Supplies Limited2°4 case and said:205 
We expressly did not say that because a worker becomes costly he or she is entitled to be dismissed 
and we said that "this Court should not be slow in pursuing job protection." 
After noting206 that there were lines of authority which supported both the union's 
argument that, to be justified, redundancy must be genuine and unavoidable, and the 
employer's argument that the court should not interfere in an employer's commercial 
decisions, the Labour Court said207 that the Arbitration Court had in many cases insisted 
200 Above, 763 . 
201 [I 982) ACJ 663 , 666 (per Woodhouse P, discussing the Arbitration Court). 
202 Hale [ 1990) 1 NZILR 752, 767 (LC 1 ). 
203 NZ Shop Employees JUOW v Maidstone Hardware Ltd [1983) ACJ 585. 
204 Auckland & Gisborne Amalgamated Society of Shop Employees Unionv North/and Office & School 
Supplies Limited [1981) ACJ 169. 
205 Above n 203 , 591. 
206 LC 1, above n 202, 763 . 
207 Above, 769 and 776 . 
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upon evidence of a threat to the employer's survival or of severe financial losses which 
could threaten survival to justify dismissal for redundancy and concluded:208 
[T]he weight of the authorities which we have cited supports the view that, generally speaking, a 
dismissal for redundancy will be justifiable only if, at the time of dismissal , the dismissal is proved to 
have been commercially necessary in the interests of the viability of the employer. The expression 
"viability" is sometimes used loosely or metaphorically; we wish to make it clear that we are using it 
in its precise or narrow meaning of capacity for survival. 
The Labour Court determined that Mr Shrubshall's dismissal was unjustified, in the sense 
that it was "not persuaded that the redundancy was unavoidable. His dismissal was not, at 
the time, commercially necessary to ensure the ongoing viability of the respondent. "209 
The Court also found that the way in which the dismissal was handled was unsatisfactory 
and ordered that Mr Shrubshall be reinstated. 
The decision was roundly criticised by employers. The Business Roundtable said that the 
decision was an "extension of legal principles in the manner of legislation.210 Another 
commentator noted, however, that the decision "appears not to have deviated in any 
significant respect from existing authorities. "211 An examination of the cases reviewed by 
the Labour Court in Hale bears out this view, as do the comments of Mr Shouler, the 
employers' representative212 on the Court, that he was "constrained by the facts and by the 
law .. . to agree with the other members of the Court as to the correct decision in this 
case."21 3 Mr Shouler considered that this "encroachment" on the right of employers to 
manage their businesses efficiently was a shortcoming, but one which it was not within the 
power of the Court to remedy effectively. The Labour Court's support for the principle of 
job protection was not a sudden extension of principle unsupported by authority, but a 
clarification of the law based on the weight of authorities. 
2 The Court of Appeal judgment 
The Court of Appeal decided that the courts were unable to examme the commercial 
justification for redundancy dismissals. It rejected the Labour Court's findings of principle 
which limited the right to manage ~d gave weight to the need for job protection. Cooke P 
said :2 14 
208 Above, 777 (emphasis added) . 
209 Above, 779 . 
210 NZ Business Roundtable/NZEF A Study of the Labour/Employment Court (NZBRT/NZEF, December 
1992) 25 . 
211 I Adzoxomu [ I 990] !LB 44 . 
212 LRA s 217(2) provided for tripartite representation in personal grievance proceedings. 
21 3 Above n 202, 780. 
214 G N Hale & Sons Ltd v Wellington etc Caretakers etc !VOW [ 1990] 2 NZILR 1079, 1084 (CA). 
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In my opinion this Court must now make it clear that an employer is entitled to make his business 
more efficient, as for example by automation, abandonment of unprofitable business activities, re-
organisation or other cost-saving steps, no matter whether or not the business would otherwise go to 
the wall. A worker does not have a right to continued employment if the business can be run more 
efficiently without him. The personal grievance provisions of the Labour Relations Act, and in 
particular the existence of remedies for unjustifiable dismissal, should not be treated as derogating 
from the rights of employers to make management decisions genuinely on such grounds. Nor could 
it be right for the Labour Court to substitute its own opinion as to the wisdom or expediency of the 
employer's decision. 
Two judges queried whether even the limited concept of procedural fairness was 
appropriate in a redundancy context.215 Richardson J said that "[i]t may well be that 
consideration of the best means of implementing planned cost savings and of the feasibility 
of redeploying workers should be viewed as matters of business judgment, not procedural 
fairness. "216 Somers J and Bisson J observed that justification in a redundancy context may 
depend on whether reasonable compensation was paid.21 7 
3 The second Labour Court judgment: procedural fairness 
The Court of Appeal remitted the case back to the Labour Court for reconsideration. The 
Labour Court determined that Mr Shrubshall's dismissal was unfair on procedural grounds, 
including the inadequacy of the redundancy" compensation offered, and awarded him 
compensation. The Labour Court declined to accept the view that procedural fairness had 
no place in the context of redundancy dismissals "in the absence of a clear direction from 
the Court of Appeal that we should do so. "218 The requirements of procedural fairness set 
out in the second Labour Court judgment in Hale went some way towards ameliorating the 
effects of the Court of Appeal's decision.21 9 The Labour Court's second decision was not 
appealed, because, it is suggested, lawyers and judges are more comfortable with the 
concept of procedural unfairness than substantive unfairness and with the concept of 
compensation rather than reinstatement. Substantive justification for dismissal , as the 
Court of Appeal noted in B W Bellis v Canterbury Hotel etc Employees JUOW, is "an 
elastic and novel concept for the lawyer"220, in that a dismissal may be lawful but not 
justifiable. "The law of unfair dismissal ... inhabits an entirely different universe from that 
of the common law. "22 1 As Collins notes in discussing unfair dismissal law in England:222 
215 Per Somers J, 1087. 
216 Above, 1086. 
217 Above, 1087 and 1088. · 
218 Wellington etc Caretakers etc !VOW v G N Hale & Son Ltd [ 1990] 3 NZILR 836, 845 (LC 2). 
219 Mazengarb's Employment Law para 1205 p 8 /217. 
220 [ 1985] ACJ 956, 959. 
221 Davidson The Judiciary and Employment Law 33 . 
222 H Collins "Capitalist Discipline and Corporatist Law - Part I" (1982) 11 ILJ 78, 88 . 
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The attention to procedural matters was perceived as less of an intrusion into industrial relations than 
the invasion which was threatened by a full-scale judicial review of the substantive merits of the 
managements decision to dismiss an employee . .. . At the same time as fulfilling the legislative aim of 
restoring order to industrial relations, the emphasis on procedure avoided the introduction of more 
penetrating interventionist reviews of managerial discretion to test whether their decision accorded 
with broader ideals of industrial justice. Thus the corporatist type of labour legislation was greeted 
only half-heartedly by the judiciary. Whilst they accepted the need for discipline and order in 
industry, they were unwilling to enforce such a profound alteration in the range of activities of the 
state. 
The law of unfair dismissal in England has been retained despite the repeal of many other 
legislative protections for workers and has become "the bedrock of our labour law. "223 In 
Collins' view this is because it apparently reduces the intensity of the contradiction of 
liberal theory "between a belief in freedom of contract as an aspect of individual liberty and 
the opportunity to use that freedom to dominate others by means of contracts between 
parties of unequal bargaining power. "224 According to Collins:225 
The principal reservation which judges are bound to feel at both the conscious and unconscious 
levels is a sense that corporatist legislation oversteps the boundary between matters which are 
suitable for state control and those which are not. ... Even though judges may be in full agreement 
with the aims of the legislation, they may feel unhappy about meddling in affairs which they have 
always regarded as matters best left to individual citizens to sort out for themselves. Thus we may 
anticipate that, in the interpretation of corporatist legislation, on the one hand the judges will be able 
to conceptualise conflict in appropriate terms and to further the main stabilising purposes of the law, 
but on the other hand they will constantly hold back from a complete endorsement of the method 
adopted by the law to achieve those ends. Thus a tension will emerge between a substantial 
agreement with the policy of the legislation and an unwillingness to put it into effect. 
4 The politics of Hale 
(a) The right to manage 
All the Court of Appeal judges stressed the inviolability of "the right to manage" in a 
redundancy context. Cooke P said that " [a] reasonable employer cannot be expected to 
surrender the right to organise his own business. "226 Somers J did "not think that an honest 
assessment of his commercial needs by an employer can be subjected to objective tests of 
fairness, reasonableness or necessity by the Court ... ",227 while Bisson J said that "a 
dismissal for redundancy is in a cl_ass of its own .. . . "228 Casey J wished to "emphasise that 
... the only question to be asked is whether the employer made that decision for genuine 
223 Above. 
224 Above. 
225 Above, 83 . 
226 Hale [1990] 2 NZILR 1079, 1084 (CA). 
227 Above, 1087. 
228 Above, 1088. 
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commercial reasons, and the employer is the best judge of what is in the commercial 
interests of the business or enterprise. "229 A feature of the judgments is the lack of 
authority or principle cited for these propositions. In particular the view that redundancy 
dismissals are subject to different principles than other dismissals is based on no clear 
authority and scant logic or legal reasoning. Richardson J purported to justify this view by 
making reference to "award provisions" (of which no examples were given) which, he said, 
specifically recognised the right of the employer to manage its business230 and Bisson J 
stated:231 
In my view a dismissal for redundancy is in a class of its own as it falls very much within the usual 
A ward provision entrenching the right of an employer to manage the business in which the worker is 
employed. 
It is submitted that this perception of award provisions relating to redundancy is incorrect. 
Such provisions do not expressly "entrench the right of an employer to manage the 
business in which the worker is employed." They simply recognise the de facto power of 
an employer to dismiss and impose consequent restrictions on that power. They do not 
recognise the right of an employer to dismiss unfairly, any more than, for example, a 
contractual provision providing for a series of warnings to be given before an employee 
may be dismissed for misconduct entrenches the right to dismiss unfairly. These judges 
converted provisions negotiated into awards to shield employees into swords against them. 
Contrary to the view that the substantive fairness of redundancy dismissals could not be 
judicially examined, the very purpose of the unjustifiable dismissal jurisdiction was to 
enable the specialist institutions to examine, and if necessary to limit, the substantive 
reasons on which employers could base decisions to dismiss.232 The Court of Appeal 
judges did not explain why substantive justification could be examined in cases of, for 
example, theft or assault at work, but not in redundancy situations. The examination of any 
dismissal is an encroachment upon the employer's "right to manage"; statutory labour law 
has never conceptualised redundancy dismissals as a special class of dismissal to be fenced 
off from examination for substantive justification. In attempting to fence off redundancy 
dismissals, the Coqrt of Appeal elevated the right to manage into a "super principle", an 
overriding consideration which could be outweighed by other considerations. This 
approach is similar to that taken by judges in administrative law that certain areas of 
229 Above. 
230 Above, 1086. Only some awards and agreements contained redundancy provisions. The content of these 
provisions varied considerably. 
231 Above, 1088. There was no such thing as "a usual Award provision" dealing with redundancy. 
232 G Anderson "The Origins and Development of the Personal Grievance Jurisdiction in New Zealand" 
(I 988) 13 NZJIR 257, 260 - 26 I and 267. 
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Government activity (eg security) are "non-justiciable" on policy grounds.233 In the 
context of unjustified dismissals, however, there is neither previous authority nor statutory 
basis for effectively making the commercial decisions of employers "non-justiciable". 
(b) Common law, statute law and social justice 
Hale is an example of the reluctance of the general courts to make statutory provisions 
which limit employers' actions effective. The Court of Appeal effectively gave precedence 
to a common law principle - judicial recognition of a right to manage by employers - over 
the plain words of the statute. Yet Richardson J implied that it was the Labour Court, 
rather than the Court of Appeal, which was going beyond the requirements of the LRA:234 
[I]t is not the function of the courts to construct an overriding extra-statutory concept of social justice 
applicable in redundancy situations. 
In so doing His Honour relegated the right to job security to a secondary status, rather than 
being a competing and equally valid consideration to be weighed alongside the right to 
manage. Richardson J's claim that the concept of social justice is "extra-statutory" is 
puzzling, since the concept of unfair dismissal is founded unequivocally on the principle of 
job protection and protection of employees from the capricious exercise by employers of 
the power to dismiss.235 Far from being an "extra-statutory" concept, social justice is one 
of the objects of the personal grievance provisions. 
As a matter of principle if an employment contract is indeed a contract between two equal 
partners, there is no reason why the employer's business .judgment should be seen as 
automatically the more deserving of judicial support. The employer's ownership of the 
assets and right to make a profit obviously require that the employer's business judgment 
be given weight. However a worker's right to job security, a right protected by statute and 
international convention,236 is a competing and, it may be argued, an equally compelling 
interest which requires that weight be given also to the worker's, and the worker's union's, 
assessment of the economic state of the employer. Indeed Richardson J subsequently 
233 G Taylor Judicial Review (Butterworths, Wellington, 1991) paras 1.24 - 1.43 pp 18 - 30; P A Joseph 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (The Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney, 1993) 657; 
Professor D G T Williams "Justiciability and the Control of Discretionary Power" in M Taggart (ed)Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action in the 1980s. Problems and Prospects(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1986). 
234 Above, 1086. 
23 5 ILO Convention No 158 on Termination of Employment (1982). Although Convention 158 has not been 
ratified by New Zealand, its provisions have often been invoked as relevant by the specialist courts: see 
Wellington Clerical Workers Union v Greenwich [1983] ACJ 965. 
236 Above. 
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articulated these two competing interests in a much-cited passage from Telecom South v 
Post Office Union:237 
Clearly Parliament has departed from the common law approach not only in relation to procedures 
and remedies but also in formulating the basic concept of unjustifiable conduct within the 
employment relationship under the Act. The contract of employment cannot be equated with an 
ordinary commercial contract. It is a special relationship under which workers and employers have 
mutual obligations of confidence, trust and fair dealing. The statutory enquiry necessarily involves a 
balancing of competing considerations. Those mutual obligations must respect on the one hand the 
importance to workers of the right to work and their legitimate interest in job security, and on the 
other hand the importance to employers of the right to manage and to make their own commercial 
decisions as to how to run their businesses. 
(c) A helping hand for the free market 
Judicial support for the free operation of market forces is essentially incompatible with the 
judiciary's view of itself as the protector of the weak against the irresponsible use of 
economic, social or legal power, and with the notion that fairness is an overriding principle 
in contemporary judicial decision-making. Faced with the opportunity to develop the law 
along lines which recognised either the principles of the free market and the right to 
manage, or the need for employee protection and a recognition of the economic inequality 
in the employment relationship, the Court of Appeal and the Employment Court took 
divergent paths. In Hale the Court of Appeal judges treated the interests of employers and 
the public interest as meaning the same thing, particularly employers' interests in a 
deregulated economy. One reason why the Court of Appeal judges cite little authority for 
their definitive declarations of "the right of the employer to manage its business" may be 
that in the political and economic climate of 1990, this right had become such a touchstone 
for those who supported deregulation that legal authority seemed scarcely necessary.238 
The particular flavour of judicial perception of the public interest in 1990 is encapsulated 
best in Bisson J's judgment which reflects the economic view that fetters on the right to 
dismiss inhibit economic growth:239 
237 [1992] I ERNZ 711 , 722 . 
238 Employer prerogative in the case of dismissal for misconduct was considered by the CA inNorthern 
Distribution Union v BP Oil [ 1992] 3 ERNZ 483 , 487 - 488 : "In the end, the question is essentially whether 
the decision to dismiss was one which a reasonable and fair employer would have taken in the circumstances" 
(per Hardie Boys J). 
239 Hale [I 990] 2 NZILR 1079, 1088 (emphasis added). This view is not based on any empirical evidence: J 
Hughes "Personal Grievances" in R Harbridge (ed) Employment Contracts: New Zealand Experiences 
(Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1993) 89 says (126) "recent evidence published by the OECD 
suggests the opposite. A scientific study of New Zealand business attitudes identifying mandatory personal 
grievance provisions as a bar to hiring workers has yet to be published." However this view seems to have 
gained currency among lawyers. S Kaminski, an industrial lawyer, is "firmly of the view that the inequities 
which employers perceive as being in the personal grievance jurisdiction have a 'chilling' effect on 
employment in this country" : ("Employment Contracts Act. Commentary on Paper by Ross Wilson" (NZ 
Law Conference Papers Vo! 2, Wellington, March 1993) 392, 395). 
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An employer must be free to exercise his own judgment of market trends, even to act on intuition. 
The progress of Hale from the Labour Court to the Court of Appeal and back again was 
driven by the NZEF, not by a small employer's fight for survival. It took place against the 
background of the Business Roundtable's vigorous promotion of the concept of 
"employment at will" , the principle that, in the interests of economic growth through the 
unfettered actions of the market, employers should be able to dismiss at will and their 
actions should not be open to judicial scrutiny. 
The Court of Appeal's judgment sent a clear message to employers that the judiciary would 
not interfere in their decisions to make workers redundant. It also sent the message that the 
courts would not review the justification for commercial decisions generally. Many 
employers, including large and influential ones, took this as being carte blanche to operate 
industrial relations policies on the basis of a legally sanctioned and unfettered right to 
manage.240 By the time the ECA was passed in May 199!241 employers were increasingly 
asserting and acting on an assumed right to unilaterally vary employment contracts based 
on the "super principle" of the right to manage. If this right could trump statute, employers 
acted on the basis that it could also trump the express terms of employment contracts. 
Subsequently the Employment Court upheld union challenges to these unilateral variations 
of individual employment contracts,242 but by the time these cases were determined the 
damage, for many employees, had already been done. 
C Attorney-General v NZ Post Primary Teachers' Association: Implying Terms -
For Whose Benefit? 
Contractual terms implied by law (ie by judges) are a type of judicial law-making. Implied 
terms play an important part in defining the political framework of employment law; they 
enable the views and values of judges to influence the content and nature of the 
employment contract. The content of implied terms and the ease with which they can be 
implied can alter the power relations in the employment contract. Who benefits from this 
240 See P Kiely and A Caisley "The Legal Status of Bargaining under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 : 
A Review of Recent Cases" in R Harbridge (ed) Employment Contracts: New Zealand Experiences(Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1993) 55 - 57. 
241 And for some employers before then: see United Food and Chemical Workers Union of NZ v Talley 
[1992] I ERNZ756. 
242 The EC in NLGOU v Auckland City [1992] I ERNZ 1109 held that Hale did not establish a general 
defence of commercial justification to breach of contract, which breach was unlawful. Hale concerned the 
justification for a lawful decision: J Hughes "Personal Grievances" in Harbridge (ed) (above) 115. lnNZPSA 
v Electricity Corp [ 1991] 2 ERNZ 365, 379 the EC made it clear that "the various observations about the 
employer's right to manage are not available as a general pretext for avoiding legal obligations voluntarily 
entered into but which it is no longer convenient to fulfil." 
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process is a political question determined by judges. The NZPPTA case concerned the 
correct test to be applied for the implication of terms into employment contracts, in this 
case a collective contract covering secondary teachers, in the light of Budget cuts to 
secondary education funding. 
1 Implied contractual terms 
(a) Terms implied in employment contracts 
Historically terms implied by judges in employment law worked to the disadvantage of 
employees. They tended to perpetuate the old concepts of master and servant law, 
reinforcing the subordinate status of the employee through the implied duty of obedience 
and the implied right to manage, and worked to the disadvantage of employees.243 A well-
known example is the decision in Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltcf244 that an 
employer's insurance company could sue the employer's negligent employee, a lorry driver, 
to recover damages paid to a third party, based upon the employee's implied contractual 
obligation to use proper skill and care in his employment.245 The implied duties of 
employers to pay wages, provide work (in some circumstances) and to provide a safe 
system of work were comparatively far less onerous. 
Implied terms of more recent development have tended to limit managerial prerogative, in 
particular the implied terms that the employer will not behave in such a way as to destroy 
or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence between employer and 
employee and of fair and reasonable treatment. 246 The corresponding refinement of the 
243 Lord Wedderburn "Labour Law: From Here to Autonomy?" (1987) 16 ILJ 1, 9 - 10. 
244 [ 1957] AC 555 (HL); [ 1957] 1 All ER 125. There was no corresponding implied term that an employee 
should be entitled to be indemnified by his or her employer's insurance; such a term was not a "necessary 
condition of master and man" (per Viscount Simonds) 132 (cited to All ER). Another example is the doctrine 
of common employment which removed an employer's vicarious liability where an employee was killed or 
injured by the negligence of another employee on the basis that the worker "knew when he engaged in the 
service, that he was exposed to the risk of injury, not only from his own want of skill, but also from the want 
of it on the part of his fellow-servants ; and he must be supposed to have contracted on the term that, as 
between himself and his master, he would run this risk": Hutchinson v York, Newcastle & Berwick Ry Co 
(I 850) 5 Ex 343, 351. . 
245 Mazengarb's Employment Law para 1026, p B/44. 
246 These terms are summarised in United Food & Chemical Workers Union of NZ v Talley [ 1992] 1 ERNZ 
756, 770. Although the CA decisions in Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [ 1985] 2 
NZLR 3 72 and Marlborough Harbour Boardv Goulden [ 1985] 2 NZLR 3 78 are usually cited as authority for 
the recognition of these terms in NZ, the Arbitration Court had long recognised the need for procedural 
fairness: see above n 58. See also the decision of the English Employment Appeal Tribunal inWoods- v WM 
Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd[ 1981] !CR 666. As the Law Commission noted, "the Goulden case may be 
explained more narrowly in terms of administrative law rules relating to the observance of natural justice by 
public agencies; and the earlier Auckland Shop Employees case may be explained in the statutory context of 
'unjustifiable' dismissals." (New Zealand Law Commission Aspects of Damages: Employment Contracts and 
the Rule in Addis v Gramophone Co - Report No I 8 (Wellington, 199 I). 
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employee's duty of fidelity, to act with good faith towards the employer, has also tended to 
impose more onerous standards of behaviour on employees.247 While more recently 
developed implied terms are potentially advantageous to employees, the continued 
application of terms such as the employee's implied duties to obey all lawful and 
reasonable orders of the employer and to work honestly and faithfully still operates 
"largely ... to control the range of actions of employees and to reinforce the power of 
employers. "248 
Terms implied by law into employment contracts in Victorian England reflected a master 
and servant mentality. In contemporary New Zealand changed attitudes mean that new 
terms implied by law should, and are more likely to, reflect the interests of employees to a 
greater extent.249 Given the power imbalance in the employment relationship, the express 
terms of many employment contracts may not adequately reflect the interests of employees. 
Attempts to establish terms implied in fact are therefore likely to be made by employees 
seeking to protect their conditions rather than by employers. The flexibility of the tests for 
implying terms as a matter of fact is therefore an important indicator of judicial politics. If 
it is easier for judges to imply terms into employment contracts, employees are more likely 
to benefit. If more rigid tests are retained, the status quo will benefit employers. 
(b) Implied terms in commercial contracts 
In Vickery v Waitaki International Ltd25° Cooke P noted that implied terms in contracts 
generally are "categories or shades in a continuous spectrum ... "251 rather than falling into 
rigid groups. Terms may be implied by law. Terms implied as a matter of fact in 
commercial contracts must meet the tests restated by the Privy Council in BP Refinery 
(Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings. 252 Under this test no term will be implied unless 
it is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract; the term contended for will be 
implied only if the contract is ineffective without it. Terms may also be "deduced by 
implication or interpretation from the express terms of the contract"253 or implied by 
custom.254 
247 See eg Tisco v Communication and Energy Workers Union [ I 993] 2 ERNZ 779 (CA); NZ Air Line Pilots 
Assn v Air NZ Ltd [1992] I ERNZ 353 (CA) . 
248 Mazengarb's Employment Law para 1027 p B/45. 
249 For example the implied term of fair and reasonable treatment. 
250 [1992] 2 NZLR 58 . 
251 Above, 64, citing the comments of Lord Wilberforce inLiverpool City Councilv Irwin [1977] AC 239, 
253 - 254 (HL). 
252 ( 1977) 16 ALR 363 (PC). 
253 Above, 64. 
254 Attorney-General v New Zealand Post Primary Teachers Assn [1992] 2 NZLR 209. 
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( c) A more flexible approach for employment contracts? 
The BP (Westernport) approach is a strict one, which may be appropriate for commercial 
contracts between businesspeople. However in 1991 the Labour Court began to develop a 
broader approach to the implication of terms in contracts of employment based on the 
special nature of those contracts. The new approach was first suggested in NZ Merchant 
Service Guild IUOW Inc v NZ Rail Ltd, 255 when the court considered whether provision for 
separate dining rooms for officers and ratings on the Arahura was a term or condition of 
employment of the officers. The court held that such a term fitted within the BP Refinery 
tests. In the course of the judgment, however, Goddard CJ also suggested that the rule that 
a term could not be implied simply because a court thought it reasonable "might not be 
applicable literally to a contract of employment or at least that the test of necessity might 
have to be measured against the nature of the modern contract of employment and its 
underlying need for a basis of trust and confidence."256 His Honour said:257 
It may also be that the prohibition against the variation by one party to a contract without the consent 
of the other ... of the tenns and conditions of the contract receives, in the case of the employment 
contract, a broad or broader view of what amounts to a tenn or condition by reason of the personal 
nature of the contract of employment. ... 
Some flexibility in the breadth of what is generally comprehended within the tenns and conditions of 
employment may be needed according to the purpose for which the definition is required. When it 
has been a question of whether some variation of duties falls within the ambit of the particular 
employment relationship so that the employer is entitled to expect the employee to accept a unilateral 
variation, the Courts have sometimes viewed the content of the employment relationship very 
broadly. 
It appears that His Honour was referring to the manner in which the courts have sometimes 
interpreted the employee's implied duty to obey as requiring the employee to agree to 
unilateral variations in working conditions eg changes to the place of work or hours of 
work or to the nature of duties.258 If a broader approach can be taken in that type of case, 
and in favour of employers' interests, then Goddard CJ appeared to suggest that there is no 
reason in principle why a broader approach should not also be taken in employees' 
interests. This approach was raised again in United Food and Chemical Workers Union of 
NZ v Talley259 in which a Full Court of the Labour Court held that it was an implied term 
of a contract of employment ( either a separate term or as part of the obligation of fair and 
255 [1991] 2 ERNZ 587. 
256 Above, 596. 
257 Above, 600. 
258 This aspect of the contract of employment is discussed by H Forrest "Political Values in Employment 
Law" (I 980) 43 MLR 361 and B Napier "Judicial Attitudes Towards the Employment Relationship - Some 
Recent Developments" (1977) 6 ILJ I. See also Wedderburn et al Building on Kahn-Freund 146 - 147. The 
memoranda issued in the TNT case, below, are an example of these types of tenns and conditions. 
259 [ 1992] I ERNZ 756, 771 . 
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reasonable treatment) that neither party would act to defeat the right of employees to 
approach their employers with grievances and to expect that those grievances would be 
settled by the employer or adjudicated on by the Employment Tribunal. 
In so deciding the Labour Court cited with approval the statements of the English Court of 
Appeal in Mears v Safecare Security LtcP60 that an industrial tribunal may have to imply 
and insert missing terms in contracts of employment without being tied to the tests for 
commercial contracts, "but can and should consider all the facts and circumstances of the 
relationship between the employer and the employee concerned, including the way in 
which they had worked the particular contract of employment since it was made .. . ". 
These observations were obiter. However, three months later the broader approach 
referred to in the NZ Rail and Talleys cases led the Employment Court to find an implied 
term in NZ Post Primary Teachers' Assn v Attorney-General (on behalf of Ministry of 
Education (No 2),261 upholding a union challenge to funding cuts in secondary education. 
2 PPTA in the Employment Court 
The P PTA case concerned Ministry of Education funding of secondary teachers' salaries 
under a Guaranteed Minimum Formula Staffing (GMFS) arrangement made up of nine 
"functional components" including Teacher Non-Contact Time Allowance (TNCTA) and 
Teacher Development Time Allowance (TDTA). TNCTA was introduced as a permanent 
scheme in 1985 to enable teachers to carry out administrative duties, preparation and 
marking, and other matters such as counselling students. TDT A was to enable teachers to 
undertake professional training and development and to allow senior teachers to supervise 
and guide junior teachers. The allowances were not made available to each teacher 
individually, but were a funding mechanism. The amount of TNCTA available to 
individual teachers was determined from time to time by the board of trustees or principal. 
The TNCTA was not expressly provided for in the collective employment contract. 
However by virtue of section 94 of the State Sector Act 1988 and clause 12.9 of the 
collective employment contract, the terms and conditions of teachers' employment were 
required to be identical before and after 1 April 1988.262 
In 1991 as a result of Budget cuts, the Ministry of Education, a party to the collective 
employment contract, decided to reduce the amount of TNCT A from 5 percent to 4 percent 
26D [ 1982] ICR 626, 648. See also BBC v Hearn [1978] 1 All ER 111. 
261 [1991] 3 ERNZ 641. 
262 Section 94( 1) provides: "The terms and conditions of employment of every person who, at the 
commencement of this Act, holds any position in the State services shall, on the 1 st day of April 1988 (and 
thereafter until varied) be identical with the terms and conditions of that person's employment in the State 
services immediately before the 1st day of April 1988." 
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of each school's classroom teaching hours, and the amount of TDT A as a result of a flow-
on effect. The practical effect of this cut was a potential loss to the profession of 105 jobs 
or at least 105 salaries. The applicant union sought compliance orders to require the 
Ministry to maintain its funding at current levels on the basis that TNCTA was one of the 
terms and conditions of employment of teachers and could not be altered downwards 
because of clause 12.9 of the contract and s 94 of the State Sector Act. The Ministry 
argued that compliance orders could not issue because the GMFS (and the TNCTA and 
TDTA which were part of it) were not contractual in nature, but merely an administrative 
procedure which the Ministry had the power to modify. 
The Employment Court held that the proposal to reduce TDT A funding was a breach of 
clause 2.5.1 of the contract, but that that clause did not expressly protect TNCTA. TNCTA 
could be protected only if the court found an implied term that:263 
[T]he Ministry will fund schools to an extent sufficient to enable them to employ teachers in such 
numbers that they will continue (as a body) to have available to them in effect five (and not four) 
weekly teacher half-days of non-contact time for every 100 such half-days of classroom teaching 
time. 
The Court found that the GMFS was introduced by government policy and not 
contractually. However as a result of its intrc:,duction and the introduction of the non-
contact time allowance:264 
[E]very teacher in a secondary school was entitled to expect to share equitably in the total teacher 
non-contact time available, in the knowledge that while the amount available to individual teachers 
from time to time would be determined by the board or its principal, it would be subsidised by the 
Crown to the extent of at least 5 percent of classroom time and available in this quantity to teachers 
as a whole. 
The Court found that the reduction in the level of TNCTA funding would bring with it a 
substantial risk that some boards of trustees or principals may reduce established levels of 
teacher non-contact time because of the reduced Crown subsidy:265 
For all these reasons I find that whatever may be the status of the GMFS, the provision of teacher 
non-contact time or its equivalent in the present quantity is a term and condition of the employment 
of every teacher in a secondary school, for he or she has an opportunity to share equitably in the non-
contact time a','.ailable to the school. That is a right that cannot be taken away. 
263 Above, 650. 
264 Above, 651 . 
265 Above. 
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In support of this broader meaning of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" 
Goddard CJ referred to the Supreme Court decision in Elston v State Services Commission 
(No 3) in which Barker J said:266 
In my view the expression "terms and conditions of employment" in reg 64A( I) is wide enough to 
include the physical environment and the stress under which work is performed. I discern this 
meaning from the clear and normal meaning of the expressions used, applying the approach to the 
interpretation of clear statutory expressions approved by the House of Lords inStock v Frank Jones 
(Tipton) Ltd [ I 978] I All ER 948 ; [ I 978] I WLR 231. Further, the decision of the English Court of 
Appeal in British Broadcasting Corporation v Hearn [ 1977] 1 WLR I 004; [ 1978] I All ER 111, 
makes it clear that the expression "conditions of employment" in an English statute should be defined 
widely so as to include the totality of the provisions of employment, not just those conditions 
articulated in a contract, but those terms which are understood and applied by the parties in practice. 
The Employment Court held that the GMFS was such a term and had for a long time been 
"an important feature of the environment, landscape or texture of the employment 
relationship" .267 While the Elston analogy was limited, "it is another illustration of a 
situation in which a Department of State, while perfectly at liberty to adopt such policy as 
it saw fit, was not entitled in the course of so doing to vary or detrimentally affect the terms 
and conditions of employment of employees without their consent. "268 In issuing the 
compliance orders on 29 November 1991 Goddard CJ said:269 
The fundamental error which led to this case and its outcome was the Ministry's action in imposing a 
reduction of the TNCT A instead of negotiating for it. Nothing that I have said precludes the 
Ministry from now embarking on a process of negotiation aimed at securing the consent of the 
applicant and its members to some variation of their rights. In the meantime, however, those rights 
must be respected. 
3 PPT A in the Court of Appeal 
(a) A narrow test for implied terms 
Less than a month later the argument for a broader approach to the implication of terms in 
employment contracts was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. Gault J delivering the Court 
of Appeal's judgment said that it was not clear whether the Employment Court had based 
the implied term on custom or "in ~ome other manner as a result of having been understood 
and applied by the parties in practice. "270 Regardless, the Court of Appeal rejected any 
266 [ I 979] I NZLR 2 I 8, 234 - 235 . Reg 64A(l) of the Public Service Regulations 1964 allowed the State 
Services Commission to suspend employees who failed to "diligently and efficiently carry out ... their full 
duties in accordance with the terms and conditions normally applying to the performance of such duties." 
267 NZ Merchant Service Guild JUOWv NZ Rail [1991] 2 ERNZ 587,601 (Goddard CJ). 
268 [1991] 3 ERNZ 641 , 652 . 
269 Above, 654. 
270 Attorney-General v NZ Post Primary Teachers Assn [1992] 2 NZLR 209, 211 (CA). 
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notion that different principles apply to the implication of terms in employment contracts 
than to other contracts:271 
It can be said immediately that the nature of employment contracts will affect the content of implied 
terms (such as duties of fairness , confidence and trust) but that does not call for any different test for 
implication in such contracts. Similarly the jurisdiction may justify a less rigid approach to evidence 
in satisfaction of the various tests but that should not detract from the tests. 
There is no established basis for the implication into employment contracts of terms that the parties 
have not agreed should be binding conditions of engagement for the reason simply that it would be 
reasonable to do so. 
Before the Court of Appeal the union submitted that a binding obligation to maintain the 
quantum of the TNCT A was to be implied on one of 4 bases: business efficacy, custom, 
interpretation of the contract by reference to an underlying assumption based on the 
reasonable expectations of the parties, and the broader approach to implication of terms in 
employment contracts (either as a modification of the above tests or as a separate test). 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the custom and business efficacy arguments as not meeting 
the established tests.272 With respect to the broader argument based on the principle in 
Elston that the mandatory continuance of the TNCT A was understood and applied between 
the parties in practice, the Court of Appeal did not address this ground separately but 
subsumed it into a general consideration of the class of implied terms invoked in Vickery ie 
terms deduced by implication or interpretation · from the express terms of the contract. 
Cooke P said:273 
The [Employment Court] judgment does not contain reference to any express terms and conditions of 
employment operative prior to 1 April 1988 that are capable of carrying an implicit undertaking by 
the ministry to be bound to the TNCT A as a term or condition of engagement. Nor was Mr Dunning 
able to point to anything other than the adoption of the working party recommendation, 
implementation and continuation at the level of 5 % of the TNCT A up to 1988, as indicating that 
persons in the position of secondary school teachers and the respondent reasonably would have 
understood that the ministry was making a binding commitment to maintain the allowance at that 
level. More than those administrative acts would be necessary. 
Barker J in the Elston case had gone far beyond the Vickery class of implied term. Had the 
Court of Appeal applied the Elston test, that terms and conditions of employment meant 
"the totality of the provisions of employment, ... those terms ... understood and applied by 
the parties in practi_ce" , or the approach taken in Mears of looking at the way the parties 
had worked the particular contract since it was made, the term contended for by the PPT A 
could have been upheld. 
271 Above, 213 . 
272 Above, 2 I 4. 
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(b) Terms "deduced by implication from the express terms of the contract" 
Despite Cooke P's comment to the contrary the EC's judgment did refer to the PPT A's 
argument that the provisions in the collective employment contract dealing with 
redeployment of surplus staff and priority rights of reappointment had meaning only if 
based on an assumption that the GMFS would continue to operate.274 The EC, however, 
did not think it necessary to determine whether the whole of GMFS was incorporated into 
teachers' contracts, but only the TNCTA component. The extent to which this argument 
was contended for in the Court of Appeal is not clear. However it appears that it would 
have been open to the Court of Appeal to "deduce" such a term from the express terms of 
the contract based on its own broad approach in Vickery v Waitaki International Ltd,275 
decided only a month earlier. 
Mr Vickery had a contract with Waitaki to provide catering services at Longburn freezing 
works. Waitaki closed the works at the end of the 1986 season and following an industrial 
dispute never re-opened them. Vickery sought compensation from Waitaki in respect of an 
alleged breach of contract. The Court of Appeal decided that it was implicit in the contract 
between Waitaki and Vickery that the works remain open and that it was a breach of 
Waitaki's contract with Vickery to close the works. Damages were awarded accordingly. 
In the light of Vickery it is difficult to see why, even if the argument for a broader approach 
to implied duties was rejected, the Court of Appeal in the PPTA case did not accept the 
argument based on the express terms of the collective employment contract. 
There is also a marked contrast in the tone of the judgments. The Court of Appeal was 
extremely sympathetic to Mr Vickery's loss of business, but totally ignored the potential 
effects of the cut in TNCTA funding on teachers. For individual teachers the Court of 
Appeal's decision meant that a significant part of their working duties, the provision of 
teacher non-contact time, was open to unilateral variation by Boards of Trustees at any 
time following the funding cuts, with potentially detrimental effects on teachers' working 
conditions and the quality of education. 
( c) Appeals on the construction· of contractual terms 
The Court of Appeal's traditional deference to the specialist jurisdiction and expertise of 
the judges of the employment institutions276 has decreased markedly in recent years. The 
274 Above, 649. 
275 Above. 
276 See Winstone Clay Products Ltd v Cartledge (Inspector of Awards) above n 60 and Wellington Road 
Transport Union v Fletcher Construction Co Ltd above n 201 . 
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P PTA and Hale cases are examples of this. 277 Goddard CJ in the P PTA case said that his 
decision was based "solely upon the meaning of the contract as disclosed by the language 
used in it in the context in which it appears .. . ".278 Section 135(1) of the ECA precludes the 
Court of Appeal from deliberating on appeals from decisions on the construction of 
employment contracts. However Cooke P said that this did not preclude the Court of 
Appeal dealing with appeals, such as the PPTA appeal, where "general principles" and 
"general implied terms" in employment contracts were at issue.279 A year later in Tisco Ltd 
v Communication and Energy Workers Union28° Cooke P, referring to Goddard CJ's 
interpretation of an express term in an employment contract as "surprising", said that 
section 135 was "a relic of the times when it was thought that the terms of industrial 
awards might be construed over-legalistically by the ordinary Courts. Whether that 
limitation on the rights of appeal on questions of law should survive today is a matter for 
the Legislature, not this Court."281 
4 The politics of the PPTA decision 
In a sense the PPTA case was never any contest. The cuts to the TNCTA were but one 
small part of the cuts introduced in Hon R Richardson's 1991 "mother of all budgets" 
which consolidated and extended cuts to public funding in social welfare, housing, health 
and education, a process started by the Labour Oovernment, accelerated by Richardson's 
economic statement in December 1990, and effectively endorsed by the Court of Appeal in 
several cases. 282 The Court of Appeal decision reflects a view that the principles of the 
New Right, including cuts to state provision of education, are in the public interest. 
Notwithstanding the effect of its decision on professional standards, the conditions of 
277 See also Air New Zealand v Johnston [ 1992] I ERNZ 700, 706; [ 1992] I NZLR 159, 165 - 166. 
278 [1991] 3 ERNZ 641 , 648 (EC). 
279 [1992)2 NZLR 209, 215 (CA). 
280 [I 993] 2 ERNZ 779, 781. Space precludes an examination of theTisco case, another CA decision in 
which the concept of implied terms is used to the benefit of employers and to the detriment of employees, and 
in which the rights of workers are subordinated to the rights of employers. Mr Reilly was a Tisco technician 
who set up a business repairing dilapidated TV sets in his spare time. The EC said that employees may 
engage in spare time ac"tivities which did not have the potential to harm the employer's business; Mr Reilly's 
activities did not breach the general duty of good faith and fidelity . Nor did they breach an express term in 
the contract prohibiting.employees from pursuing "electronic trade practices for monetary reward", since Mr 
Reilly was retailing not servicing and there was no direct competition. This was overturned by the CA which 
failed to consider "what limits may be reasonable on an employee's spare time activities ... ": G Anderson 
[1993] ELB 107, 108. See also M Gundesen [1993] ELB 103. 
281 Above, 78 I. Anderson (a!}d, impliedly, Gundesen) agree with Cooke P that the restriction in s 135(1) is 
outmoded. For an example of a case where the CA reached a different conclusion on the interpretation of an 
express term in an employment contract, see Radio NZ v Clark [1993] I ERNZ 270. It is not clear why s 
135( I) was not applied in this case. 
282 These are discussed by Kelsey Rolling Back the State. 199 - 207. See in particular the discussion (206) of 
Maddever v Umawera School Board of Trustees (Unreported, September 1992, High Court, Whangarei). 
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teachers, and the learning situation of children, the Court of Appeal backed the more 
powerful. 
5 A "new" law of contract: judicial reality or rhetoric? 
Measured against the benchmark that the adoption of common law rules is an indicator for 
an outcome disadvantageous to workers, the P PTA case supports the thesis that the Court 
of Appeal is developing employment law along a different, and less just, path to that taken 
by the Employment Court. The Employment Court's more flexible approach to the 
implication of terms in employment contracts gave scope for a significant shift away from 
the traditional use of implied terms by judges to reinforce the subordinate status of 
workers. This approach had the potential to lead not only to fairer outcomes, but also to 
greater restriction of the right to manage by limiting employer discretion to unilaterally 
alter "terms and conditions" in the workplace. To the extent that the Court of Appeal 
rejected this approach, it reinforced the common law view that a contract of employment is 
indeed a command in the guise of an agreement. 
The Court of Appeal decision in the PPTA case is also incompatible with Sir Robin 
Cooke's conceptualisation of New Zealand law as being fundamentally about the search for 
a fair and just solution.283 It also suggests that employment law is excluded from the 
development of a "new" law of contract in New Zealand.284 McLauchlan has argued that 
"we in New Zealand have a more liberated and adventurous judiciary .... I detect a greater 
recognition of the realities of the contract making process and willingness to adapt and 
change the law accordingly; more awareness that people do not read standard-form 
contracts and often do not reduce the whole of their agreement to writing. "285 As an 
example of the "new" law of contract McLauchlan refers to the Blackpool Airport286 case 
in which the English Court of Appeal changed the law relating to tendering processes by 
importing contractual obligations into the process of calling for, and submitting, tenders. 
McLauchlan says that this approach, based on considerations of commercial convenience 
and fairness, is an example of the "new" law of contract and rejects criticism of the 
Blackpool Airport case as being contrary to commercial expectations:287 
My judgment is that commerci.al men and women would welcome the imposition of the kind of 
limited legal obligation imposed by the court in theBlackpool case. Such a result tends to enhance, 
not undermine, the utility of the tendering process. Of course, this disagreement goes to show once 
again that the reasonable outcome will often be a matter on which careful minds, weighing all 
283 Sir R Cooke "Fairness" ( 1989) 19 VU WLR 421, 422 . 
284 D W McLauchlan "The 'New' Law of Contract in New Zealand" [ 1992] NZ Recent Law Review 436. 
28 5 Above, 447. 
286 Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool Borough Council [1990] I WLR 1195 . 
287 Above n 284, 46 I . 
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relevant considerations, may differ. One's judgment as to what is reasonable is dependant on one's 
life experience, philosophical starting-points, and moral values. 
Given the special nature of the employment contract, employment law should have been a 
launching pad for the "new" law of contract. As the Court of Appeal noted in the Telecom 
South case, "the contract of employment cannot be equated with an ordinary commercial 
contract. It is a special relationship under which workers and employers have mutual 
obligations of confidence, trust and fair dealing. "288 A broader approach to the implication 
of terms in employment contracts seems fair and reasonable given the special nature of 
employment contracts, their ongoing nature and need for flexibility, and the fact that the 
detail of employment arrangements often cannot be spelled out in a written contract. The 
concept of terms of employment "understood and applied by the parties in practice" is no 
more vague and difficult to apply than legal concepts such as the requirement that 
administrators must act "fairly, reasonably and in accordance with the law"289 or the 
concept of "legitimate expectation" in administrative law. 
As McLauchlan points out "it is trite learning that one of the major purposes of the law of 
contract is to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties. "290 The result of the P PTA 
case seems particularly unfair because any individual secondary teacher would almost 
certainly have had a reasonable expectation that teacher non-contact time would have 
continued on the same basis as it had prior to 1988, and, it is suggested, if asked, would 
have said that it was "part of my terms and conditions of employment". 
D TNT Worldwide Express (NZ) Ltd v Cunningham:291 Workers and Contractors 
The decision to apply a rule of commercial law rule may be a political one. Judges are able 
to manipulate the point at which such rules are imposed to suit their perception of the 
public interest. In the P PTA case the rule related to implied terms. In TNT v Cunningham 
where the issue was the status of one of the parties to the contract, a similar approach by 
the Court of Appeal led to a similar outcome. In TNT v Cunningham the Court of Appeal 
held that Mr Cunningham, a courier driver, was an independent contractor rather than an 
employee employed under a contract of employment. In so deciding the judges denied Mr 
Cunningham access to the personal grievance procedures in the Employment Contracts Act 
and the protection of the "minimum code of employment" . The Court of Appeal's decision 
departed from established legal principle and endorsed an ideological perspective which 
288 Telecom South v Post Office Union [1992] I NZLR 275, 285. 
289 Sir Robin Cooke "Fairness" (I 989) I 9 VUWLR 42 I, 426. 
290 Above n 284, 440, referring to Corbin on Contracts (1963) vol I, 2. 
291 [1993) 3 NZLR 681 (hereafter TNTv Cunningham). 
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favours the free market and freedom of contract over the need to protect workers in an 
environment where inequality of bargaining power often leads to unfair outcomes. 
I Workers and independent contractors: the traditional tests 
The distinction between workers and independent contractors has consequences in taxation, 
tort and employment law. In employment law the issue is usually whether a person has 
access to protective statutory provisions.292 Workers, but not independent contractors, are 
entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Wages Protection Act 1983 (which provides 
for wages to be paid in money and without deduction), the Holidays Act 1981 (which 
provides for statutory and annual holidays, as well as "special leave" for sickness and in 
other circumstances), the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 and the 
Minimum Wage Act 1983 . A worker, but not an independent contractor, also has access to 
the personal grievance procedure in the ECA. 293 
The distinction has always been problematic for the courts, which developed various tests 
to assist them in analysing the relationship at issue. The earliest test was the "control test." 
Historically control was an important indicator of a contract of service (as discussed in Part 
I). The judicially implied term of obedience by servants to lawful and reasonable orders of 
their masters meant that employers still retained considerable control over their employees. 
The control test requires the courts to assess whether the employer has the right to control 
what work the employee does and the manner in which he or she does it. At one stage the 
control test was determinative, but gradually it became only one of several tests to be 
applied. While the test was simple to apply to relationships such as the employment of 
agricultural or domestic servants, it became more difficult when the "servant" possessed 
greater skill than the "master", for example in the case of a hospital surgeon.294 
The increasing complexity of organisations and employment relationships led judges to 
develop other tests.295 These included the "integration" test (was the person "part and 
parcel of the organisation"?); the "business" or "fundamental" test (was the person engaged 
to perform the services as a person in business on his or her own account?); the "view of 
the ordinary person" test (would ·an ordinary person categorise the relationship as one 
between worker and employer or· as one between two independent contractors?); and the 
292 Wedderburn et al Building on Kahn-Freund 145 - 167. 
293 By way of exception the definition of "worker" in s 2 of the ECA includes "homeworkers" whether such 
workers are engaged, employed or contracted to do work for another person. 
294 Mazengarb's Employment Law para 2.8 pp A/31 - A/34. 
295 These tests are discussed in Mazengarb's Employment Lawparas 2.7 - 2.20 pp A/30 - A/52. See also NZ 
Workers' Union v Dyer [1980] ACJ 291 (AC). 
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'balancing all the factors' test.296 For many years in New Zealand the courts favoured a 
pragmatic and broad 'balancing all the factors' test, as Blair J confirmed in McMullin 
Holdings Ltd v Auckland Clerical Workers Union:297 
It does seem that in the type of case with which we are now concerned the correct approach is to look 
broadly at the whole transaction and apply the various tests which the Courts have from time to time 
suggested should be used in deciding the category in which a particular worker should be. 
2 The TNT arrangement 
In 1989 Mr Cunningham (C) started work as a courier driver for TNT. He had previously 
worked as an owner/driver for ASC Flowers under an arrangement whereby he had 
purchased a business, could take on other clients, and had eventually sold his business. 
The Employment Tribunal found298 that these were "three key distinctions" between C's 
arrangement with ASC Flowers and the TNT arrangement. A few days after C started 
work for TNT he was given a copy of a deed of agreement and was given only a few 
minutes to peruse it before he signed it. The Tribunal found that the contract was presented 
to C as a fail accomp/i: "The company representative indicated no amendments would 
have been permitted. "299 The contract labelled the relationship as "that of independent 
Contractor" ( clause 7), but the labelling of such contracts is not decisive in determining the 
true nature of the contract.300 The Employment Tribunal and Employment Court301 
concluded that the contract was one of employment. On appeal the Court of Appeal 
reversed these decisions unanimously. 
It was accepted by the decision makers at all levels that there were factors which supported 
the view that C was an independent contractor and factors which supported the view that he 
was an employee. C was required to provide and maintain his own car, to rent a radio 
telephone from the company, to procure a goods service licence in his own name and 
certify that he was the owner of his business. Couriers were required to take out their own 
independent insurances and prepare their own tax returns. They paid ACC levies and were 
taxed as independent contractors. GST invoices were prepared by TNT at the couriers' 
request. All of the~e factors pointed towards an independent contractor. On the other hand 
TNT exercised a considerable degree of control over the couriers. The contract provided: 
296 See eg Wood v Dobson [1969] NZLR 60 (Compensation Court). 
297 [ 1969] NZLR 530, 531 (AC). 
298 [ J 992] J ERNZ 956, 964 . · 
299 Above, 965 . 
300 Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions & National Insurance [ 1968] I All ER 
433, 439 (per MacKenna J). 
301 [1992] 3 ERNZ 1030. 
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1. That the contractor will conduct for the company a courier service over such routes and servicing 
such customers as the company may from time to time direct and will for such period and in such 
places as the company may require and assist with the handling, sorting and consolidating of 
customer goods in transit. 
2. The contractor shall: 
(g) Conduct the courier service in accordance with the directions of the company and at all times be 
courteous and cooperative to the company's customer, the company, its servants and other couriers. 
(h) Not commit nor omit any act which may jeopardise or otherwise adversely affect the earnings 
of the company or its reputation as a courier operator. 
The company also issued memoranda to the couner drivers from time to time.302 For 
example in January 1991 they were advised that the company direction and philosophy 
would revolve around "one team. 11303 Other memoranda included: 
21 November 1990 
TIME OFF: 
I find that I am increasingly aware of contractors having time off when your relief driver turns up on 
the morning you are first away. 
I would like to remind you that official policy is: All relief drivers should be approved prior to 
taking over your van and that time off should be arranged at least two working days before your time 
off. 
30 April 1991 
5. Image. A very important part of the TNT growth strategy and a pet project of Dennis's. This 
includes vehicles inside and out, uniforms, clean and correct. ID tags to be worn at all times, no dogs 
to be carried with you, no children, wives etc except in unusual circumstances. Should any of you 
still be waiting on parts of the uniform from the original issue please see myself as soon as possible. 
UNIFORMS 
The above uniform is to be worn at all times when on duty. No other garments are acceptable .... 
The uniform remains the property of the company and is to be surrendered should the employee 
leave the company. 
Couriers had to operate within a strictly regulated system of work, reporting at the depot at 
7 .30 am, being ready to leave at 8.00 am, back from their first "run" at 10.30, and so on. 
The Employment Court noted304 that "this mimics the standard employment situation of 
clocking in, clocking out and three spells in the smoko room or cafeteria." C had to wear a 
uniform and include the company logo on his car, which was to be painted in the 
company's colours. Couriers were not able to accept work from TNT's competitors or 
302 These are set out in the EC's judgment at 1040 - I 044. 
303 Above, I 042 . 
304 Above, 1049. 
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directly from clients. They could not refuse to service a particular client of TNT and could 
arrange for a substitute driver for a maximum of 20 working days per year, and then only if 
the relief driver was approved by the company. Couriers did not generate a business which 
could be sold. 
3 The Employment Tribunal decision 
The Tribunal emphasised that the case concerned "access to a Tribunal for the remedy of 
an alleged injustice"305 and commented on an article by Collins in which he discussed the 
deficiencies of the traditional tests for determining whether a person was a worker or an 
independent contractor and proposed a simplified rule as follows :306 
That a contract of employment exists for the purposes of employment protection law if the worker 
performs services for another, referrable to a contractual agreement, unless that contract satisfies two 
conditions: that it is a task performance contract, and that no badges of membership of the firm's 
organisation apply. 
The Tribunal did not specifically approve the Collins approach, but adopted a "threshold" 
approach in considering whether Chad access to the personal grievance procedure:307 
If there are sufficient attributes of an employer/employee relationship which justify employment 
protection for the individual driver, then irrespecti_ve of there being a greater number of factors which 
suggest an independent contractor relationship then the right of access to justice for a personal 
grievance should not be denied. Accordingly, my task is a multi-factor assessment of the 
circumstances of this case, but one in which greater weight can be applied to certain factors than 
others. 
Despite the reference to a "threshold" approach, the actual reasoning process applied by the 
Tribunal was the traditional "balancing all the factors" test, which has never been a simple 
process of arithmetic, but has always involved some factors being given more or less 
weight than others. 
4 The Employment Court decision 
On appeal the Employment Court was quick to dismiss a complaint that the Employment 
Tribunal "devoted _considerable space to an article advocating what the law should be 
rather than describing what it is, because the terms of the decision leave me perfectly clear 
in my mind that [the Tribunal] recognised the article for what it was."308 The Court also 
305 [ 1992] I ERNZ 956, 962 (ET). 
306 H Collins "Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to Employment 
Protection Laws" ( I 990) Ox JLS 353, 378. 
307 Above n 305, 963 - 964. 
308 [1992] 3 ERNZ 1030, 1033 (EC). 
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rejected the appellant's argument that the Tribunal had incorrectly applied the "threshold" 
test. It noted that arguments about the onus of proof were "largely foreign to the personal 
grievance jurisdiction"309 but that to the extent that it was an appropriate consideration, and 
in cases where the employer was asserting that contract was something else than what it 
appeared to be, the onus was on the employer to prove that the person concerned was a 
contractor not a worker.310 The Employment Court said that in considering whether a 
contract was an employment contract or a contract for services:311 
The Court gives effect to the intention of the parties (which means the intention of both parties) and 
whatever relationship they have meant to adopt is the relationship which the Court will recognise .. .. 
Sometimes it can be unclear what the parties' intention is and then the Court resolves the doubt by 
applying certain tests or criteria which are said to be indicia of the existence (according to the 
intention of the parties) of one or other of the two relationships. 
When speaking of intention, the Court's inquiry is not limited to the intention expressed in any 
written contract but can be deduced from all the circumstances and an examination of the history of 
the contract in operation because, as it is important to recognise, the Court is dealing not with a 
contract governing a single transaction but with a contract governing a continuing contractual 
relationship. 
Goddard CJ emphasised that the terms of any written contract were not wholly 
determinative of the status question :3 12 
... [I]n cases involving a dispute about the nature of the contractual relationship between the parties, 
it is in my opinion just as important to look at how the relationship works in practice as at how it is 
theoretically supposed to work according to the written document. One reason for that is that a 
written agreement cannot possibly set out all the detailed terms of the arrangement and may not, in 
some cases, disclose its true nature but rather camouflage it. 
The Court went on to note that the 2 criteria currently enjoying the most widespread vogue 
were the control test and the fundamental ( or "business") test. The control test was most 
recently given prominence by the Court of Appeal in Challenge Realty Ltd v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue313 , upholding the Commissioner's decision that real estate salespersons 
employed by real estate agents licensed under the Real Estate Agents Act 1976 were 
employees rather than independent contractors. The Real Estate Agents Act provided for 
effective control of salespersons by the licensee or branch manager. The Court of Appeal 
recognised the importance of control , following the decision of the Privy Council in 
Australian Mutual Provident Society v Chaplin: 314 
309 Above, I 036 . 
31 0 Above, 1038. 
311 Above, 1033 . 
312 Above, 1046. 
313 [ I 990] 3 NZLR 42. 
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The second principle is that, while all relevant terms of the contract must be regarded, the most 
important, and in most cases the decisive, criterion for determining the relationship between the 
parties is the extent to which the persons, whose status as employee or independent contractor is in 
issue, is under the direction and control of the other party to the contract with regard to the manner in 
which he does his work under it. 
The second "in vogue" test was the "fundamental" or "business test" applied by the Privy 
Council in Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi-Keung.31 5 Their Lordships approved the test as 
described by Cooke Jin Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security:316 
The fundamental test to be applied is this: 'ls the person who has engaged himself to perform these 
services performing them as a person in business on his own account?' If the answer to that question 
is 'yes,' then the contract is a contract for services. If the answer is 'no,' then the contract is a contract 
of service. 
Applying these tests to the relationship between C and TNT, the Employment Court said 
that control was very tight and, after reviewing the terms of the contract, found that "it 
would be a nonsense to suggest that the respondent was in business on his own account."317 
The TNT contract, according to Goddard CJ, failed both of the most important tests. C was 
therefore an employee, and had access to the personal grievance procedure in the ECA. 
5 The Court of Appeal decision 
(a) Analysing the relationship or interpreting the contract? 
The Court of Appeal reversed the decisions of the Tribunal and Court. The 2 leading 
judgments were delivered by Cooke P and Casey J, but, as with the Electricorp case, the 
true flavour of the Court of Appeal's decision is encapsulated in the dicta of Hardie Boys J, 
who said that "[t]here are many reasons why both employer and contractor prefer the 
independent contractor arrangement. They should be free to exercise their choice without 
paternalistic intervention by the Courts."318 Unfortunately as Davies and Freedland point 
out:319 
Nothing is more misleading than the ambiguity of the word "freedom" in labour relations . ... To 
mistake the conceptual apparatus of the law for the image of society may produce a distorted view of 
the employment relation. This in tum may lead to the uncritical and undiscriminating application to 
it of rules developed for relations of real co-ordination (where the parties are "at arms length") such 
as most commercial contracts .. .. 
315 [1990) 2 AC 374. 
316 [1969) 2 QB 173, 184 - 185. 
317 [1992) 3 ERNZ 1030, 1054 (EC). 
318 [1993) 3 NZLR 681,698 (CA). 
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This is precisely what the Court of Appeal did. If the Court had adopted the usual 
approach of looking broadly at the whole transaction, including any written contract, and 
applying the recognised tests, particularly the control test and the fundamental test, it must 
have found that the relationship was an employment contract. The Court of Appeal was 
able to find that C was an independent contractor only by adopting a different framework 
for analysis and careful selection of material facts. 320 The Court of Appeal treated the case 
as one of pure interpretation of a commercial contract. This was a new approach and one 
which contradicted its own approach in the Challenge Realties case and the Privy Council 
decision in Chaplin. Cooke P emphasised the importance of the written contract:321 
When the terms of a contract are fully set out in writing which is not a sham ... the answer to the 
question of the nature of the contract must depend on an analysis of the rights and obligations so 
defined .... In the end, when the contract is wholly in writing, it is the true interpretation and effect of 
the written terms on which the case must tum. 
This purely commercial law approach begs the question whether the contract was wholly in 
writing and departs from the hitherto settled "balancing all the factors" test, in which the 
terms of any written contract would be an important factor, but set against a broader 
consideration of what the parties actually did and how they actually behaved. In making 
the written contract the sole test of whether a relationship was one of service or one for 
services, the Court of Appeal was making new law. In Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi-Keung 
Lord Griffiths said:322 
Whether or not a person is employed under a contract of service is often said in the authorities to be a 
mixed question of fact and law. Exceptionally, if the relationship is dependent solely upon the true 
construction of a written document it is regarded as a question of law: see Davies v Presbyterian 
Church of Wales [I 986) 1 WLR 323 . 
Cooke P referred to this extract, and the Davies decision, in support of the view that the 
question was simply one of interpretation of the contract. 323 However the Davies decision 
had nothing to do with the distinction between independent contractors and workers. It 
was about whether there was a contractual relationship at all between a minister of the 
Presbyterian Church and the Church itself, not what type of contract may have existed.324 
320 G Anderson "Recent Case Comment" [1993) ELB 68, 70. 
32! [1993]3NZLR681,686(CA). 
322 [ 1990) 2 AC 374, 384 (PC). 
323 Above n 321, 687. 
324 See also the discussion in NZ Couriers v Curtin [ I 992) 2 ERNZ 541 (CA). There have always been 
special rules relating to the "employment" of ministers of religion : J J Macken, G McCarry and C Sappideen 
The Law of Employment (The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1990) 42. 
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The supremacy of contract approach is usually appropriate and fair in a commercial law 
context. In Masport Limited v Morrison Industries Ltcf325 the Court of Appeal dismissed 
an argument that a written agreement for sale and purchase had been varied or added to by 
a subsequent letter.326 Robertson J said:327 
... I am not satisfied that two substantial public companies, transferring a business involving many 
millions of dollars which was effected by senior members of the commercial community with the 
assistance of legal advice, after determining that their arrangements should be contained in a written 
form , would make such fundamental and radical variations (or collateral arrangements) without a 
formal record in writing. 
Robertson J referred to similar comments by Kirby P in Austobel Pty Ltd v Frankl ins Self-
Serve Pty Ltd: 328 
We are not dealing here with ordinary individuals invoking the protection of equity from the 
unconscionable operation of a rigid rule of the common law. Nor are we dealing with parties which 
were unequal in bargaining power. Nor were the parties lacking in advice either of a legal character 
or of technical expertise. The Court has before it two groupings of substantial commercial 
enterprises, well resourced and advised, dealing in a commercial transaction having a great value. 
In his book Judging Judges Lee discusses the importance of precedent m commercial 
cases:329 
[E]ven when commercial cases come to court, there are powerful reasons why the judges should 
usually defer to the past law even if they think that a fairer solution could be achieved by some 
innovation. Commercial organisations on all sides of a problem will have been legally advised at all 
stages of the drafting of a contract, for example, and will have budgeted for the contract to be 
construed according to established legal techniques. 
The facts of TNT v Cunningham expose the utter inappropriateness of a pure 
"interpretation of the contract" approach to C's relationship with TNT. C and his courier 
van were worlds away from the types of commercial enterprises and arrangements 
described above. C had no independent legal advice, was in a substantially weaker 
bargaining position than TNT, and had to sign a contract which the company presented to 
him as a fait accompli and which was effectively non-negotiable. While Cooke P 
recognised the "exacting and rigorous"330 nature of the TNT contract and said that the TNT 
memoranda "have a bureaucratic and disciplinary air and bring out how extensive are the 
325 31 August 1993, Court of Appeal, CA 362/92 (Cooke P, Richardson & Robertson JJ) ; [ 1993) BCL 318. 
326 Above. "Businessmen and their lawyers are often loud in their stress on the need for certainty in 
commercial law. When it seems expedient, however, many are ready to destroy certainty by contending that 
an apparently written bargain was not what it seemed" (per Cooke P, 2). 
327 Above, 13 (per Robertson J). 
328 ( 1989) 16 NSWLR 582, 585. 
329 S Lee Judging Judges (Faber & Faber, London, 1988) 196 (emphasis added). 
330 [1993) 3 NZLR 681 , 689. 
60 
powers of control exercisable by the company under the contract"331 , he failed to give any 
consideration to the actual effect of these provisions on Mr Cunningham. By finding that 
"a considerable degree of control" was compatible with contractor status, the Court of 
Appeal gave contractors the worst of both worlds: without the freedom available to a truly 
"independent" contractor, but without the benefit either of the protective provisions in the 
ECA:332 
The Courts must recognise the increasing use of contracts for services in many business activities, of 
which courier and other owner-driver operations are but one example. Where there is a large 
organisation and a competitive industry, a considerable degree of control may be required to ensure 
cohesion and efficiency, and a high public profile. This will be for the benefit of the contractors as 
well as of the owners of the business. The voluntary assumption of such controls in order to gain 
entry to the industry should not be seen as a reason for treating the contract as other than what on an 
overall consideration it truly is . 
The Court of Appeal's determination to adopt a pure freedom of contract approach in TNT 
v Cunningham appears to stem from ideological preference rather than legal principle. One 
commentator has categorised the approach of the Court of Appeal as "entirely orthodox"333 
and another as a "decision to support the status quo."334 The writer disagrees. The Court 
of Appeal, in abandoning the "balancing all the factors" approach and in introducing a test 
in which the written terms of the contract are the most important factor, has altered the law. 
(b) The use of precedent 
Judicial consideration of the independent contractor/employee distinction in New Zealand 
has tended to emphasise facts, rather than precedent, within an established framework of 
well-known tests .335 Having categorised the decision as one purely of law, the Court of 
Appeal , however, was able to give greater emphasis to precedent, notably the Ready Mixed 
Concrete case,336 which supported the conclusion that C was an independent contractor. 
Thus, while Goddard CJ said that it was "a nonsense"337 to suggest that C was in business 
on his own account, Cooke P said that the Ready Mixed Concrete case and the Australian 
judgments mentioned therein,338 and Mr Cunningham's arrangement "appear naturally to 
meet the test whether a person has engaged himself to perform services and to do so in 
33 1 Above, 687 . 
332 Above, 698. 
333 J Hodder (1993) 16 TCL 25/1. 
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business on his own account .. . . "339 These precedents were able to be invoked only by 
emphasising particular aspects of the TNT arrangement rather than others. Anderson 
says:340 
The TNT case is an excellent illustration of how a Court's selection of the material facts influences 
the outcome .... The Employment Court concentrated on the detailed control over the drivers and the 
apparently limited ability to have any real or significant influence over the level of earnings. The 
Court of Appeal stressed such matters as the ownership of capital, the method of payment and the 
holding of the Goods Service Licence. 
The decision makers also disagreed on the importance of precedent in the sense of practice 
in the industry. It was accepted by all decision makers that courier drivers were treated 
generally in the industry as independent contractors. A change would have considerable 
impact in the industry. On this point the Employment Tribunal said:341 
Mr Ford urged me to have regard to the risks of a finding against the respondent which would have 
consequences for a very large number of people and organisations. On that issue I merely state that I 
am required to apply the law as I find it, to the facts of this particular case even if reluctant because 
to do so might fly in the face of an established commercial practice. 
The Court of Appeal took a different view:342 
It was said that this case stands on the application of facts and relevant law in respect of him alone. 
But this is to ignore or minimise the effect of the decision as a precedent. The respondent's 
proceeding may be seen as an attempt to change an established statw, in the transport industry. 
The Court of Appeal's reluctance to overturn accepted practice in the courier industry in 
TNT v Cunningham contrasts with its decision in the Challenge Realty case, which affected 
the tax status of many real estate agents. The effect of this decision was subsequently 
reversed by legislation. 343 
6 The politics ofTNTv Cunningham: worker protection or paternalism? 
Although neither the Employment Tribunal nor the Employment Court relied on the 
Collins article, the Court of Appeal judges devoted considerable discussion to it. Cooke P 
concluded:344 
339 Above n 321, 685 . 
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In truth the result arrived at by the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Court is attainable 
only if the present law is developed by a change such as advocated in the Collins article . In my 
opinion the Courts should not shrink from such a development should a reconsideration of common 
law decisions show them to be untenable or unsatisfactory in principle, provided however that the 
development is not contrary to legislative policy. In the end I am not satisfied on either head here . 
As to legislative policy, s 2 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 appears plainly intended to 
preserve existing principles, for it provides that "Employment contract" means a contract of service; 
and includes a contract for services between an employer and a homeworker. Only the latter type of 
contract for services is brought within the framework of the Act. As to past common law decisions, I 
am unable to fault the conclusions of McKenna J and Dixon J, despite some small differences in 
some of their reasoning. 
The Court of Appeal also quashed any notion that "policy considerations favouring worker 
protection" might apply in an employment context, despite the fact that neither the 
Employment Tribunal nor the Employment Court had relied on such considerations. 
Robertson J referred to what he considered to be Goddard CJ's "predisposition for the 
ability to obtain relief under the Employment Contracts Act. "345 Casey J concluded that 
the ECA recognised the distinction between contracts of employment and independent 
contracts and that section 2 "may be taken as reflecting a deliberate choice by the 
legislature militating against the adoption of policy considerations favouring worker 
protection when interpreting the nature of employment contracts. "346 With respect it is 
submitted that this view is incorrect. The definitions of employer and employee in the 
ECA are almost identical to the corresponding definitions of employer and worker in the 
Labour Relations Act. This indicates an intention by the legislature to retain the legal 
principles relating to workers and contractors which applied before 1991 , not to introduce 
new principles. 
As noted in the analysis of Hale , above, there is no reason in principle why "worker 
protection" should not be a factor which the courts should take into consideration in 
interpreting employment contracts. Changes in the nature of employment relationships 
(more outwork, casualisation, part-time work, removal of award protections, supply of 
temporary labour through employment agencies) and economic factors also indicate that a 
"worker protection" principle could be judicially developed. In any case, contrary to Casey 
J's observations, the ECA does recognise the principle of worker protection by retaining the 
personal grievance procedure itself and extending it to individual contracts as well as 
collective ones. This point was given some emphasis by the Minister of Labour in his 
second reading speech on the Employment Contracts Bill. He noted that the ECA was "a 
major improvement on the Labour Relations Act where only union members are 
guaranteed access to grievance procedures"347 and said that "underpinning the 
345 Above, 701 . 
346 Above, 694 . 
347 Hon W F Birch, Minister of Labour, Second Reading Speech Notes, Employment Contracts Bill, 10. 
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[Employment Contracts] Bill's principles of choice are the statutory minimum protections 
available to employees." 
The TNT decision replicates the features of Hale and the PPTA decision: a disregard for 
the consequences of its decision on workers with little bargaining power, reliance on 
common law principles of commercial law which are inappropriate in an employment law 
context, a distaste for the principles of social justice and worker protection, and the 
championing of the interests of the powerful over the powerless. TNT discloses (again) the 
Court of Appeal's ideological preference for free market economics and a deregulated 
labour market. As the endorsement of the right to manage in Hale was relied on by 
employers to support unlawful attempts to unilaterally alter employment contracts, the 
decision in TNT v Cunningham has the potential to encourage wholesale contracting out in 
areas where employment contracts have been the norm. As Anderson points out:348 
The impact of the TNT decision may take some time to emerge . ... It is unfortunate that in its 
decision to protect the status quo in an established contractual arrangement the Court of Appeal did 
not consider more fully the possible abuses of the mythical freedom of contract in employment 
relationships and the actual economic and power reality of employment relationships. 
348 [1993] ELB 70. 
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IV ENDING 
The differing approaches to employment law of the Court of Appeal and the Employment 
Court are trends or tendencies rather than a predictable and invariable pattern of decision-
making. Obviously not all cases decided since the ECA came into force fall neatly within 
an analysis in which the Employment Court takes greater account of the need for justice, 
fairness and worker protection, while the Court of Appeal applies stricter principles 
consistent with commercial contract law. Although these differing approaches characterise 
many decisions, the Court of Appeal has not invariably overturned Employment Court 
decisions which benefitted employees.349 Nor, in the initial period after the ECA was 
passed, did the Employment Court accept arguments which might have shielded workers 
from the aggressive bargaining tactics adopted by employers intent on utilising the 
"freedom of contract" principles in Part II of the ECA to the maximum extent possible. 
Unions attempted unsuccessfully to challenge these tactics in a series of cases in 1991 and 
1992, arguing that the Employment Court should interpret the ECA bargaining provisions 
so as to include requirements to bargain in good faith, to show a willingness to 
compromise, and not to seek to undermine the employees' choice of a union bargaining 
agent.350 
In Adams v Alliance Textiles351 the Employment Court held that in the absence of undue 
influence, employers were able to pressure employees over their choice of bargaining 
representative and to go behind an authorised representative's back to negotiate directly 
with employees. In Hawtin v Skellerup Industrial Ltcf352 the Court said that the term 
"negotiation" included presenting the workforce with a contract on a "take it or you'll be 
locked out" basis and (obiter) that a single employee could be locked out.353 In Paul & NZ 
Community Services Union v Society for the Intellectually Handicappecf3 54 the Court 
accepted the employer's argument that its advice to its employees that it would no longer 
observe or perform certain provisions of their collective employment contract, in order to 
compel them to agree to a new collective contract, was a breach of that contract and was a 
349 For example in Hobday v Timaru Girls ' High School Board of Trustees [1993] 2 ERNZ 146 the CA 
confirmed the EC's decision, following its own earlier decision in X v Y & NZ Stock Exchange [ 1992] 1 
ERNZ 863, that it could grant an interim injunction reinstating an employee pending a hearing on the merits 
of a personal grievance application. 
350 These cases are discussed by P Kiely and A Caisley "The Legal Status of Bargaining Under the 
Employment Contracts Act 19.91: A Review of Recent Cases" in R Harbridge (ed)Employment Contract: 
New Zealand Experiences (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1993) 53 . 
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lawful "partial lockout." The resulting unilateral wage cuts, therefore, were not technically 
unilateral variations of the employment contracts. 355 
The \'ice-President of the NZ Council of Trade Unions, Mr R Wilson, expressed "quite 
bitter disappointment" that the Employment Court had taken what he called a narrow, 
conservative approach to the interpretation and application of the Act, particularly the 
bargaining provisions.356 His comments suggest that unions were anticipating that the 
Court would apply more protectionist principles. Walsh says that the Employment Court 
was simply moving with the political times: "It has to take account ... of the political 
whims and the political balance. The political message they took out of the passage of the 
Employment Contracts Act was for an entirely deregulated bargaining environment. "357 
However during 1992 and 1993 the debate over the future of the Employment Court was at 
its height.358 Wilson suggests that the Court's conservative approach over bargaining 
matters was prompted by self-preservation: "Had the court taken a more creative and 
liberal approach to the Act it would have jeopardised its very existence as an institution. "359 
Certainly in the more moderate political climate following the 1993 General Election 
Employment Court decisions have reflected a return to a more traditional, protectionist 
approach. In Service Workers Union of Aotearoa Inc v Southern Pacific Hotel 
Corporation (NZ) Ltd360 the Court said, in finding that the employer had breached the 
union right of entry provisons in section 14 of the ECA, that the Act's object of promoting 
an efficient labour market required efficient conduct of negotiations361 and that the freedom 
of association provisions required free access between employees and their representatives 
in working hours and at the place of work. In a clear rejection of a broader appeal to the 
requirements of the free market, Goddard CJ said:362 
The aims of the Act can be ascertained by the Court only from the language that Parliament has 
chosen to use. If by referring to fundamental aims the respondents are thinking of some objectives 
that they imagine to exist outside the legislation, then I have to say that the Court has not means of 
divining what they could possibly be. 
355 Kiely and Caisley, above n 350, 64, explain the reasoning process. 
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Comment" [1993] ELB 97. 
361 Above, 530. 
362 Above, 526 - 527. 
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The Court of Appeal in Eketone v Alliance Textiles (NZ) Ltc[363 expressed, in cautious 
terms, doubts that an employer could bypass an authorised representative and negotiate 
directly with employees.364 Hodge says that this " 'note of warning', sounded on 5 
November 1993, was a tocsin in the Employment Court."365 In February 1994 in 
Mineworkers Union of NZ Inc v Dunollie Coal Mines Ltd366 Palmer J issued an interim 
injunction restraining a lockout by an employer who had bypassed the employees' 
authorised bargaining agent, their union, because firstly there was an arguable case of 
undue influence and secondly an employer cannot claim that a lockout relates to the 
negotiation of a collective employment contract (and is therefore lawful), when it 
deliberately bypasses an authorised bargaining representative. The partial lockout doctrine 
was overturned when the Court in Witehira v Presyterian Support Services (Northern)367 
refused to follow its earlier decision in Paul & NZ Community Services Union v Society for 
the Intellectually Handicapped368 and awarded the employees arrears of wages in respect of 
their employer's unilateral and unlawful reduction of their pay rates. 
This trend continued in NZ Medical Laboratory Workers Union Inc v Capital Coast Health 
Ltd, 369 in which the Court held that a "wide range of activities by both employers and 
employees in the course of negotiations may also breach the mutual obligations to maintain 
confidence and trust between employer and employee."370 The comment that, in deciding 
whether one party had breached the mutual obligations, "the question of motive or the 
presence or absence of good faith may be decisive"371 indicates that the Employment Court 
may be moving towards the judicial establishment of a "good faith bargaining" requirement 
in negotiations.372 
363 [1993) 2 ERNZ 783 . For comment onEketone see J Hughes "The Court of Appeal on 'Recognition' of 
Unions" [1994) NZLJ 164; G Anderson [1993) ELB 105; W Hodge "Future Directions in New Zealand 
Employment Law in the New Political Environment" (Paper presented to Institute for International Research 
Fifth Annual Employment Law Conference, 27 and 28 June, 1994, Wellington) Appendix C 2 - 3. 
364 [1993) 2 ERNZ 783 per Cooke P (787) and Hardie Boys J (788). However the CA agreed with the EC's 
earlier decision that there was no presumption of undue influence in the employer/employee relationship and 
that the ECA does not require an employer to be union-neutral. 
365 Hodge, above n 363 , Appendix 3, 3. A tocsin is "[a] signal, especially an alarm-signal, sounded by 
ringing a bell or bells" :· The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Vo! 2, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993). 
366 [1994) 1 ERNZ78. 
367 [1994) 1 ERNZ 578. 
368 [ I 992) I ERNZ 65 . 
369 Unreported, 12 August 1994, WEC 45/94 (Goddard CJ and Travis J). 
370 Above, 43 , (emphasis added). 
371 Above, 44 . See also Rassh v Wellington City Council [ 1994] I ERNZ 367, where Goddard CJ said (372) 
that the employer's actions "amounted to an uncalled-for interference in and obstruction to the exercise of the 
employees' inherent freedom of association including the right to bargain collectively and to organise for that 
purpose, which is a part of that freedom, as is recognised by the Employment Contracts Act 1991." 
372 Compare the approach in the JHC case, above n 354, 85 . See also New Zealand Law Society Seminar 
Employment Contracts Act Revisited (NZLS Apri l/May 1992, Leaders P Churchman and W Grills) 54. 
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The jurisprudential gap left in 1991 is filling slowly as the Employment Court consolidates 
a more protectionist approach based on the freedom of association and bargaining 
requirements of the ECA.373 Hodge notes that this "sea change in attitude"374 was 
reinforced by the report of the Committee on Freedom of Association of the International 
Labour Organisation in response to a complaint by the NZ Council of Trade Unions.375 
Consistently with Griffith's thesis, it gained momentum following the 1993 election in 
which New Zealand voters expressed strong disapproval of the excesses of the New Right 
revolution and support for a new political system.376 
Gault J in Eketone v Alliance Textiles (NZ) Ltd indicated a cautious approach to the 
application of the freedom of association requirements in the ECA. His Honour noted that 
it was "appropriate to have reference to the terms of, and decisions upon, international 
instruments dealing with fundamental rights when interpreting the scope of those rights 
under our Bill of Rights and other relevant legislation"377 but said there was nothing in the 
international instruments which required a broader prohibition than that contained in 
section 8 against undue influence regarding membership of an employees' association: 
"Indeed, any move to preclude all attempts to influence a person's choice would risk 
conflict with another fundamental right - the freedom of expression (s 14 Bill of Rights 
Act) ."378 As Wedderburn notes, "freedom of association" in the context of labour law has 
been interpreted judicially as having at least two quite distinct meanings:379 
To be meaningful in a purposive sense, the term connotes protection for the collective aims of the 
[union] association ... So too, the ILO regards the opportunity to bargain and some kind of right to 
strike as essential elements in "freedom of association" itself ... But others, including the Law Lords 
in 1970 and the Canadian Supreme Court in 1987, have held that a constitutional "freedom to 
associate" bears no such meaning. It is no more than a right to associate together, not a right to do 
anything at all in association ... It is significant that judges who take that second, emasculating view -
that workers can exist in "association" without any industrial rights to bargain or to strike, without 
infringement of the right to "freedom of association" - always point out that they can still pursue 
"friendly society" objectives. Nor is it surprising to find that those propounding individualist 
philosophies interpret this freedom with emphasis, like Hayek, upon the right todissociate. All these 
attitudes to freedom of association involve not legal interpretations but ideological assertions. 
373 See also Bartle v Romano's Pizzas (Wellington) Ltd(Unreported, 15 September 1994, WEC 49/94) in 
which Castle J issued interim injunctions _restraining the employer from bypassing the employees' authorised 
bargaining representative. 
374 Hodge, above n 363 , Appendix 3, 2 .. 
375 Case 1698, 292nd Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association to the Governing Body 
(GB.259/7/14, 20 March I 994, Geneva) paras 675 - 741. The complaint was filed with the Governing Body 
of the ILO on 9 February 1993 . 
376 See also Kelsey Rolling Back the State 211 . 
37? (1993) 2 ERNZ 783 , 794. 
378 Above, 794 . 
379 Wedderburn "Freedom of Association" 16. The view expressed in the 1992 NZLS seminar paper, above 
n 372, 4, that "[f]reedom of association is not longer a functional concept but little more than an abstract idea" 
can no longer be considered reliable. 
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While sections 60(a) and 64 of the ECA make express provision for the right to strike and 
Part II of the Act provides for the right to bargain collectively, the boundaries of these 
rights have only begun to be determined judicially. Whether in a changed political climate 
the Court of Appeal will continue to promote the principles of management prerogative and 
freedom of contract and the strict rules of the common law of contract, or whether it will 
endorse the Employment Court's purposive interpretation of the freedom of association 
requirements in the ECA, remains to be seen. 
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APPENDIX 
A MODERA TE/TRADffiONAL APPROACH TO LABOUR 
RELATIONS: EXTRACT FROM DEEKS, PARKER AND RYAN 
LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND1 
1 Individual Rights: 
• People should be free to join, or not to join, a trade union as they see fit, and free to choose the 
union or bargaining agent they wish to represent them; voluntary forms of unionism are therefore 
preferable to complusory forms . 
2 Collective Rights: 
• Trade unions are necessary and useful organisations for the protection and advancement of the 
rights and interests of employees . 
• Union rights to organise, to bargain collectively , and to strike are fundamental rights in a 
democratic society. 
• Collective decisions made in a democratic manner may at times override individual interests; in 
such situations there should nevertheless be protections for individuals from victimisation by the 
group . 
3 Workplace relationships 
• Given the nature of the employment relationship in a capitalist society, some degree of conflict of 
interests between employer and employee is inevitable. 
• Employers and managements are the architects of labour relationships; they reap what they sow. 
• Compromise, consultation and negotiation is a better basis for resolving conflicts at the workplace 
than the unilateral imposition of one party's interests on the other. 
4 Participatory democracy 
• Individuals should have access to, influence over, and, through collective action, potential control 
of the decisions that impinge on their lives, whether in the workplace, the community or the state . 
• There should be increased employee participation in the ownership and management of business 
organisations and state enterprises . 
5 Role of the State 
• The public interest in labour relations lies in the maximisation of the autonomy of individuals and 
groups, whether in trade unions or in private or public sector enterprises, to control their own 
affairs. 
• Government should act in labovr relations to protect the disadvantaged and the rights of minority 
groups and to prevent exploitation. 
1 J Deeks, J Parker and R Ryan Labour and Employment Relations in New Zealand (2 ed, Longman Paul, 
Auckland, 1994) 29 - 30. The approach set out in these points is expanded on by the authors at 30 - 31. 
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